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Cyberspace is a global domain (also regarded as a 5th military domain1), involving private and 
public, civilian and military sectors. It is also a domain where ideologies and national, economic 
and geopolitical interests and positions clash. As digitalization has transformed every aspect of 
our society, improved our businesses and everyday lives, information and communication 
technologies (abbr. ICTs) have also caused an emergence of new security vulnerabilities. At 
interconnected and -dependent times of such increasingly wide range that the technology has 
provided to the world, the peace and security of the world is threatened by the malicious actions 
of states and non-state actors, including violent extremist groups or terrorists. Unscrupulous 
state and non-state actors have found new channels to spread misinformation and propaganda, 
to assemble and collect resources and conduct cyberattacks and -operations.  
As cyberspace has created new challenges in interstate relations, so have various non-state 
actors, such as terrorists, with new means imposed new threats to health and safety of peoples, 
functioning of businesses and states, to political stability, and ultimately, to our democracies in 
general. With such a global domain that we all are so dependent on, the consequences of 
possible terror attacks are more significant than ever. 
Both terrorism and cyber security threats are, besides the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, state failure and organised crime, main threats and challenges to national security.2 
In 2010, the United Kingdom referred to international terrorism and “cyber attack, including 
by other States, and by organised crime and terrorist” as two of four “Tier One” threats to 
British national security.3 In 2016, the Obama administration released the Cybersecurity 
National Action Plan that addressed the challenge of malicious actors, including terrorists, 
operating in cyberspace. It was also acknowledged that “attacking us online is often easier than 
attacking us in person”.4 According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2020, 
cyberattacks constitute a major global risk considering both their likelihood and impact.5 
 
1 European Defence Agency. Cyber Defence. Available at: 
https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/all-activities/activities-search/cyber-defence 
2 G. Lindstrom, E. Luiijf. National Cyber Security: Framework Manual. Political Aims and Policy 
Methods. Gen. ed. A Klimburg. NATO CCD COE. Tallinn. 2012, pp. 47-48. 
3 HM Government. A strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. 2010, p. 
27. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/619
36/national-security-strategy.pdf 
4 The White House. President Barack Obama. Office of the Press Secretary.  Fact Sheet: 
Cybersecurity National Action Plan. 2016. Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-
action-plan 
5 The World Economic Forum. The Global Risks Report. 2020. Available at: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risk_Report_2020.pdf 
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According to the 2021 report, the threats posed by technologies remain high and 
misinformation, cyberattacks, targeted strikes and resource grabs are only on the rise.6 Notably, 
terrorist attacks are one of the most imminent global risks.7 In December 2020, the European 
Commission released a new EU Cybersecurity Strategy in which Ylva Johansson, the European 
Commissioner for Home Affairs, addressed the need to secure key infrastructure against (inter 
alia) terrorist attacks. She stated: “To ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market and 
the livelihoods of those living in Europe, our key infrastructure must be resilient against risks 
such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, accidents and pandemics like the one we are 
experiencing today”.8 
The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Agenda 2020 also addressed the need to tackle the rising threat 
of terrorism in the EU. The Agenda marked that the nature of terrorist attacks is shifting and 
the EU needs to prepare for threats both rising from new technologies, e.g. malicious use of 
drones, artificial intelligence, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material, as well as 
the use of online propaganda. The latter often becomes the integral part of the attack itself.9 
With their own intrinsic features, both terrorism and digital technologies pose significant 
challenges to international peace and security.  
While the new technologies have generated new opportunities for terrorists to operate, they 
have also created new ways for law enforcement to tackle the threat of terrorism.10 The question 
is whether our legal system manages to keep up the run of rapid technological development and 
hold the individuals and institutions responsible for the acts of terrorism.  
One of the crucial concerns when it comes to terrorist use of cyberspace is accountability. That 
also raises the concern as to whether the international law provides sufficient measures to hold 
cyberterrorist responsible for the acts of cyberterrorism.  
 
6 The World Economic Forum. The Global Risks Report. 16th Edition. 2021, p. 53. Available at: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2021.pdf 
7 Ibid. p. 7.  
8European Commission. New EU Cybersecurity Strategy. New EU Cybersecurity Strategy and new 
rules to make physical and digital critical entities more resilient. 2020. Available at: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2391  
9 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions. A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond. 




10 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Frequently Asked Questions on 
International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism. Vienna: UNODC. 2009, pp. 11-13. Available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FAQ/English.pdf 
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This thesis focuses on the role of international law in ensuring responsibility for the acts of 
cyberterrorism. It does so by first exploring the nature and the definition of cyberterrorism under 
international law. Secondly, the current international legal framework on cyberterrorism and 
legal means of ensuring responsibility will be examined. Thirdly, in case there are gaps in legal 
framework, this paper intends to find possible remedies to ensure responsibility (and thus 
increase the accountability) for such acts.  
For that end, this paper utilizes qualitative dogmatic legal analysis and deductive analytical 
methods. The author analyses international legal framework in regards to cyberterrorism. For 
this analysis, primarily grammatic and comparative interpretation methods will be used. Based 
on this analysis, the author also uses a deductive method to propose possible ways forward to 
strengthen responsibility for the acts of cyberterrorism. For the analysis real life cases of 
terrorism, cyberattacks and cyberterrorism will be used to exemplify the dogmatic analysis. 
Main sources used for this thesis are international legal instruments (conventions, treaties), 
scholarly writings (articles, books, commentaries) and court rulings. 
Keywords 
Cyberterrorism; Cyber Security; International Crimes; Cyber Crimes; Cyber Warfare, Cyber 
War; Cyber Act of war; Use of force; Armed attack; Act of Terror; Act of Aggression; Act of 
Violence; Information Security; Accountability; Responsibility; Cyber; Cyber Attack; 




1. CHAPTER 1 - DEFINING CYBERTERRORISM 
1.1. Terrorism 
1. 1.1. Terrorism - the roots of the conundrum 
Cyberterrorism consists of two widely contested terms “cyber” and “terrorism”. This 
subchapter explores the definition of terrorism, including its roots and the nuances related to it. 
Based on the findings of this subchapter, the next subchapter will analyse what terrorism means 
in cyberspace. 
Walter Laqueur, an influential scholar on terrorism, counted more than 100 definitions of 
terrorism. The only common characteristic he found was that they all include violence or the 
threat of violence.11  
The term has lived a double life through societies of the world, on the one hand it has been 
considered a political strategy, on the other hand, a monstrosity of a mankind. For example, in 
1793, the Jacobin leader during the French Revolution, Maximilien F.M.I de Robespierre, when 
describing the actions of the Jacobin Club, said that "Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, 
severe and inflexible."12 During their two years in power they executed 17,000 opponents, the 
period which is known as La Terreur or Reign of Terror. The word “terror” was also proudly 
used by the Russian revolutionaries who assassinated Czar Alexander II in 1881.13 German 
revolutionary Karl Heinzen, in his 1853 political pamphlet "Mord und Freiheit" (“Murder and 
Liberty”), also saw terrorism as a progressive tool of violence to bring political change and 
boost progress in society and coined the term terrorism with Freiheitskämpfer (or freedom 
fighter).14 Over time, the term “terrorism” grew its universal stigma and was used rather as a 
condemnation. It was then increasingly associated with movements of national liberation and 
some so-called “terrorists” preferred the terms of freedom fighters, guerrillas or mujahedeen.15 
One of the last groups to call themselves terrorists was a Zionist organization called Lehi (aka 
Stern Gang). The terrorists of Stern Gang killed 91 people in Jerusalem in 1946. As the stigma 
 
11 W. Laqueur. The new terrorism: fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 1999, p. 12. 
12 G. Nunberg. HEAD GAMES / It All Started with Robespierre / "Terrorism": The history of a very 
frightening word. SFGATE. Opinion. 2001, updated 2012. Available at:  
https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/HEAD-GAMES-It-All-Started-with-Robespierre-2865759.php 
13 Ibid. 
14 UNODC. Counter-Terrorism Module 1. Key Issues: Terrorism in the 19th Century. Vienna. 2018. 
Available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-1/key-issues/terrorism-in-19th-century.html; 
D. Bessner, M. Stauch. Karl Heinzen and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Terror. Terrorism and 
Political Violence. Volume 22. 2010. Available at:  
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550903445209 
15 G. Nunberg. 2001, updated 2012.  
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spread, by the 1990s, “terrorism” was used in all kinds of intimidation or disruption. People 
who infected computers with viruses immediately became cyberterrorists in the eyes of the 
public and cult leaders were described as psychological terrorists.16 
Exploring the roots of terrorism (which can go back to the 11th century17, or, according to other 
sources the 19th century18) only confirms the double-headedness of the concept.  The term has 
found a vast variety of interpretations by historians, scholars, politicians and  the population in 
general. Qualifying acts of violence, e.g. political assassinations or violent uprisings, as 
unjustifiable criminal acts or, instead, justifiable movements of liberation, is often difficult as 
it is to draw the line between these concepts. Therefore, to this day, the world has no 
internationally binding definition of terrorism and the definitional issues around the concept 
continue. 
Subsequently, terrorism has also been used as a pejorative term for acts, including both methods 
and ends of conduct, that fall below standards of acceptable ethical conduct.19 People have used 
this term with included morality and for a long time it has been regarded as a foreign concept 
with a sense of otherness.20 Thus the term has, in many cases, not been utilized as an impartial, 
value-neutral, tool for assessing activities and tactics of political actors.21 Similarly, R. Värk 
describes terrorism as “imperfect, emotionally charged and politically influenced”.22 
1.1.2. Mainstream definitions 
Popular dictionaries have still found a way to define this controversial concept. According to 
Oxford Dictionary terrorism is the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against 
civilians in the pursuit of political aims. Cambridge Dictionary defines terrorism as “(threats 
of) violent action for political purposes”.23 Collins dictionary defines terrorism as “the use of 
violence, especially murder and bombing, in order to achieve political aims or to force a 
government to do something”.24 Encyclopedia Britannica defines terrorism as “the calculated 
use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 M. Burgess. History of Terrorism. POGO. 2012. Available at: 
https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2015/02/brief-history-of-terrorism/ 
18 B. Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. 1998, p. 17. 
19 D. M. Jones, M.L.R. Smith, P. Schulte, C. Ungerer. Handbook of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism 
Post 9/11. USA. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 2019, p. 2. 
20 Ibid. p. 7. 
21 Ibid. p. 2. 
22 R. Värk. Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of Armed Force. ENDC Proceedings, Volume 
14. 2011, p. 75. 
23 Cambridge Dictionary. Terrorism. Available at: 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/terrorism 
24 Collins Dictionary. Terrorism. Available at: 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/terrorism 
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particular political objective”.25 Similarly, the Macmillan Dictionary defines it as “the use of 
violence to achieve political aims”.26 Thus, according to all of these popular dictionaries, 
terrorism refers to violence with political motivation. 
1.1.3. Characteristics of terrorism 
Common themes embedded in the definitions of terrorism are the following: 
1) the use or threat of violence 
Terrorism involves tactics and strategies that use violence (or the threat of such). This violence 
could cause serious harm, death or serious damage to property.27 Conventional attacks used by 
terrorists are, to name a few28, assassinations, beheadings29, bombings, arson, hostage-taking, 
hijacking, kidnapping, sabotage, biological weapons, the perpetration of hoaxes and suicide 
bombings. Unconventional terrorism could include nuclear terrorism (e.g. attacking a nuclear 
reactor)30, cultural terrorism31 (e.g. ISIL attacking ancient statues at the Mosul museum in 
2015), ecological terrorism (e.g. the threat of destruction to the environment)32, information 
warfare33, high-tech terrorism34 (for instance, simultaneously exploding a bomb at a train 
station, launching a cyberattack on the critical infrastructure, using Trojan horses, worms, 
viruses, denial of service attacks, and other information warfare tools).35  Thus, the terrorist 
threat has a complex nature, as there is a broad spectrum of attack scenarios.36 
2) intention to create fear 
 
25 J. P. Jenkins. Terrorism. Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism 
26 Macmillan Dictionary. Terrorism. Available at: 
https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/terrorism 
27 R. Värk. 2011, p. 81. 




29 BBC News. Running for your life from terror in north-east Mozambique. 12 March 2021. Available 
at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-56373615 
30 Counter-Terrorism Module 1. Key Issues: United Nations and Terrorism. 2018.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 F. Ristoldo. Attacks against Cultural Property as a weapon of war: An exploratory case study. 
Institut Barcelona Estudis Internacionals. 2016-2017. Available at: 
https://www.ibei.org/ibei_studentpaper34_105354.pdf 
34 Counter-Terrorism Module 1. Key Issues: United Nations and Terrorism. 2018. 
35 World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology. Status and Requirements of Counter-
Cyberterrorism. Available at: 
https://publications.waset.org/11708/status-and-requirements-of-counter-cyberterrorism 
36 N. A. Makhutov, V. P. Petrov, and D. O. Reznikov. Countering Terrorism: Biological Agents, 
Transportation Networks, and Energy Systems: Summary of a U.S.-Russian Workshop. Chapter: 7 
Characteristics of Technological Terrorism Scenarios and Impact Factors. 2009, p. 55. 
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Acts of terrorism are explicitly intended to create fear, not just among the direct victims but 
among a wide audience - usually with an underlying political aim.37 The underlying goal could 
entail coercion of a government, an international organization or an individual.38 In order to 
create fear, terrorists must engage in increasingly dramatic, violent, and high-profile attacks. 
These have included hijackings, hostage takings, kidnappings, mass shootings, car bombings, 
and, frequently, suicide bombings. 
Depending on the overall goal, terrorists can be referred to as  "separatist", "revolutionary", 
"ethnocentric", "nationalist" or "religious".39 For example, terrorists that have revolutionary 
goals seek to tear down current political systems and replace it with one of their liking. Italian 
Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang), the Basque separatist 
group ETA, the Peruvian Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), and ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant; also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) could be regarded as 
revolutionary terrorists.40 
Terrorism and its motivations are dependent on the current social and economic culture. This 
dependency can also be described with David Rapoport's concept of the "waves" of terrorism 
('The Four Waves of Terrorism'), these are, for example, the anarchist wave which emerged in 
the late nineteenth century/early twentieth century, the anti-colonial wave (starting with the 
post-World War I political principle of self-determination, e.g. as mentioned in Tartu Peace 
Treaty of 02.02.192041), as well as extreme left waves and religious waves (as what we have 
occurring nowadays).42 Each wave describes the dominant strategic goals of terrorism during a 
specific time and space. 43 Parker and Sitter (2016), on the other hand, claim that terrorism and 
its motivations are rather dependent on four goal-oriented categories: socialism, nationalism, 
 
37 R. Värk. 2011, p. 81. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Counter-Terrorism Module. 1 Key Issues: United Nations and Terrorism. 2018. 
40 Britannica Encyclopedia. Types of Terrorism. Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism/Types-of-terrorism 
41 It states the following: "In consequence of the right of all peoples to self-determination, to the point 
of seceding completely from the State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by the Socialist and 
Federal Russian Republic of the Soviets, Russia unreservedly recognises the independence and 
sovereignty of the State of Estonia, and renounces voluntarily and forever all sovereign rights 
possessed by Russia over the Estonian people and territory whether these rights be based on the 
juridical position that formerly existed in public law, or in the international treaties which, in the sense 
here indicated, lose their validity in future." From: Article 2 of Peace Treaty of Tartu. Tartu, Estonia, 
02.02.1920. Available at: 
https://hub.xpub.nl/termsofservice/peace-treaty-of-tartu.html 
42 D. Rappoport. The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. A. Cronin, J. Ludes, 
eds. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press. 2004, pp. 46–73. 
43 Counter-Terrorism Module 1. Key Issues: Brief History of Terrorism. 2018. 
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religious extremism or exclusionism which do not necessarily rise and fall but can also occur 
in parallel and work as underlying motivators for different terrorist movements.44 
The acts of terrorism could also be seen, on the one side, as the political martydoms, 
beautification and sacralization of violence, a personal commitment to a "cause that could 
inspire others, and epitomised the revolutionary 'code of honour' by sparing innocent 
citizens".45 
3) location of attack:  
To cause fear in the population, terrorists tend to choose high profile, increased shock value, 
attack locations that have high intensity of civilian population (schools46, shopping centres47, 
bus and train stations48, restaurants and nightclubs49, airports50, concerts51) and buildings and 
other locations that are important economic or political symbols (embassies, military 
installations, churches).52 Thus, terrorist threats are also global in nature as they are 
characterized by widespread distribution of the attacking locations.53 
4) indiscriminate targeting 
The modern acts of terrorism tend to be indiscriminate in their target selection. That means that 
terrorists do not make a distinction between civilians and military objectives, as humanitarian 
law prescribes. The industrialized and indiscriminate means and methods of warfare utilized 
during the world wars taught post-war revolutionary terrorists to disregard the principle of 
distinction and to adopt more irregular weapons and forms of fighting, such as urban guerrilla 
 
44 Ibid.; 
T. Parker, N. Sitter. The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains. Routledge. 2016, p. 
199. Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112277 
45 Counter-Terrorism Module 1 Key Issues: Terrorism in the 19th Century. 2018. 
46 Encyclopedia Britannica. Peshawar school massacre. Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Peshawar-school-massacre 
47 See, for example, BBC News. Westgate attack: Two jailed over Kenyan shopping mall attack. 2020. 
Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54748341 
48 See, for example, BBC News. 7 July London bombings: What happened that day? 2015. Available 
at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598 
49 The New York Times. Realizing It’s a Small, Terrifying World After All. Orlando Shooting. 2016. 
Available at:  
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/us/orlando-shooting-america.html 
50 See, for example, South China Morning Post. Istanbul airport bombers planned to take hostages 
during attack. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/1984157/istanbul-
airport-bombers-planned-take-hostages-during-attack 
51 See, for example, BBC News. Ariana Grande reflects on Manchester bombing ahead of 
anniversary. 2020 Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-52752383 
52 J. P. Jenkins. Terrorism. Encyclopedia Britannica. 
53 N. A. Makhutov, V. P. Petrov, and D. O. Reznikov. 2009, p. 55. 
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warfare.54 Indiscriminate weapons (e.g., high-level bombing capacities, weapons of mass 
destruction) is a recurring feature in the modern threat landscape.55  Due to the features of 
cyberspace, attacks through cyberspace could be even more indiscriminate against its targets.  
5) Non-state actor:  
Terrorism in general refers to acts committed by nonstate actors. However, including state or 
state-sponsored terrorism under the definition has also been suggested (and debated upon). In 
practise, the term “terrorism” has also been used to refer to the acts committed by the state. For 
example, Iran has referred to the attack on the 11th of April 2021 against Natanz nuclear facility 
as an act of “nuclear terrorism” and attributed the attack to Israel.56 As well, there has been 
state-supported terrorism, for example, Iran and Syria have allegedly provided logistical and 
financial aid to Islamic revolutionary groups engaged in campaigns against Israel, the United 
States, and some Muslim countries in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.57 
1.2. Cyberterrorism 
Terrorists, as well as other malicious actors have gained many advantages with the utilization 
of different technological means (such as automatic weapons or compact, electrically detonated 
explosives). It gives terrorists new methods and opportunities that provide greater mobility and 
increased lethality and spread of the attacks.58 Cyber means are also attractive options for 
modern terrorists, as they can provide anonymity, and have the potential to inflict massive 
damage, cause serious psychological impact, and inflict media appeal.59  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (abbr. UNODC) report outlines the means by 
which the Internet is utilized for terrorist purposes, these are: propaganda (including 
recruitment, incitement, radicalization), financing, training, planning (including preparatory 
secret communication and publicly available information), execution (inducing fear, fabricating 
or circulating threat over Internet), cyberattacks (including disrupting the functioning of target’s 
computer systems, servers or underlying infrastructure).60 
 
54 Counter-Terrorism Module 1 Key Issues: Brief History of Terrorism. 2018. 
55 Ibid. 
56 The New York Times. Blackout Hits Iran Nuclear Site in What Appears to Be Israeli Sabotage. 
Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/11/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-natanz.html 
57 Encyclopedia Britannica. Types of Terrorism. Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism/Types-of-terrorism 
58 Ibid. 
59 G. Weimann. Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat? United Nations Institute of Peace. Special 
Report. Washington. 2004, p. 6. Available at: 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf 
60 Frequently Asked Questions on International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism. 2009, pp. 3-11. 
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In addition to the use of the Internet, cyberterrorism can go even beyond, covering the use of 
hardware, software, information systems, but also people, content, social interactions within 
these networks.61 Cyberterrorism is, thus, a terrorist’s use of cyberspace. Cyberspace can be a 
tool, target, or a space of a crime (including cyberterrorism).62 The International 
Telecommunications Union (abbr. ITU) uses the term “cyberspace” to describe the “systems 
and services connected either directly to or indirectly to the internet, telecommunications and 
computer networks”.63 
Therefore, terrorists could use open source media for spreading disinformation, sophisticated 
use of media for recruitment and radicalization, encrypted applications for communications, 
conducting ransomware attacks and using phishing to spread malware, attacking IoT devices, 
etc. 
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism, terms that both create 
discussions about their essence.64 Cambridge Dictionary defines cyberterrorism as “the use of 
the internet to damage or destroy computer systems for political or other reasons”.65 According 
to Encyclopedia Britannica, cyberterrorism is “the use of the Internet to cause public 
disturbances and even death” and leaves political aim out of the definition.66 Collins dictionary 
ties the definition more directly with human consequences, as it states “cyberterrorism is the 
use of computers and the internet to attack or frighten large numbers of people, usually in order 
to achieve political aims or to force a government to do something”.67  
Mark M. Pollit defines cyberterrorism as “the premeditated, politically motivated attack 
against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence 
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.” In this case, 
cyberspace (including, for example, computer systems) is a target rather than a tool. Pollit’s 
 
61 M. E. Hathaway, A. Klimburg. National Cyber Security: Framework Manual. Cyber Terms and 
Definitions. Gen. ed.  A. Klimburg. NATO CCD COE. Tallinn. 2012, p. 8. 
62 ISO/IEC 27032:2012. Information technology - Security techniques - Guidelines for cybersecurity. 
2012, para. 4.18. Available at: 
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:27032:ed-1:v1:en 
63 ITU. ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide. Geneva. 2011, p. 5. Available at: 
https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/itu-national-cybersecurity-guide.pdf 
64 D. Denning. Articles, testimony on the subject before the House Armed Services Committee in May 
2000; 
Also: Mark M. Pollitt’s article ‘Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fancy?,’ published in Computer Fraud and 
Security in 1998 
65 Cambridge Dictionary. Cyberterrorism. Available at: 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/cyberterrorism 
66 Encyclopedia Britannica. Cybercrime. Types of Cybercrime. Available at: 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/cybercrime#ref1285671 
67 Collins Dictionary. Cybererrorism. Available at: 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/cyberterrorism 
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definition is utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States.68 
Dorothy Denning similarly defines cyberterrorism as “the convergence of cyberspace and 
terrorism. It refers to unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and 
the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in 
furtherance of political or social objectives.”69 Nelson et al. define cyberterrorism as follows: 
“Cyberterrorism is the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property to intimidate or 
coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are political, religious or 
ideological.” These definitions focus on defining cyberterrorism as an attack against ICTs, 
however, the term has also been used more broadly referring to cyberspace as a tool or a space 
of cyberterrorism (in addition to being a target of an attack).70 In parallel, the term 
“technological terrorism” that includes cyberterrorism but also electromagnetic, biological, 
chemical, radiological terrorism, is also used by some authors. Technological terrorism has 
been defined as “actions directed against infrastructure elements critically important for 
national security or committed with the use of specially hazardous technologies, technical 
means, and materials”.71 This definition, however, leaves out political motivation or social 
objectives, does not define attacker or target people but adds that the attack must be against 
critical infrastructure. 
Therefore, the difference between kinetic terrorism versus cyberterrorism is that cyberterrorism 
involves the use of digital means or digital targets.72 Additionally to the elements of 
conventional terrorism, i.e. political or ideological motive, fear as an outcome and presumably 
a non-state actor, cyberterrorism has also a digital element related to the crime.73 
Cyberterrorism has the capability to cause damage of an unpredictable amount or level and 
spread enormously.74 Cyberterrorism could be appealing to terrorists as it is much cheaper, 
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more anonymous than traditional methods, the variety and number of targets is very large and 
it can be conducted remotely.75 Costs to launch a grave malicious cyber operation are much 
lower than the costs of kinetic operations whilst the consequences of a cyber operation could 
be much worse.  
It is important to bear in mind that all malicious operations through networks should not 
automatically be classified as acts of cyberterrorism. For an act to be qualified as 
cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause 
enough harm to generate fear of such violence or damage. Acts of cyberterrorism would be, for 
example, attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic loss. 
Attacks with significant impact, for example, against critical infrastructures could be acts of 
cyberterrorism. Attacks that merely disrupt nonessential services or that are just costly 
disturbances without a significant impact would not qualify as cyberterrorism.76  
Although perhaps the feared threat of cyberterrorism has not yet fully materialized, there have 
been several early warnings (especially after the 9/11 attacks in 2001). Already in 1977, Robert 
Kupperman, then Chief Scientist of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
stated:“Commercial aircraft, natural gas pipelines, the electric power grid, offshore oil rigs, 
and computers storing government and corporate records are examples of sabotage-prone 
targets whose destruction would have derivative effects of far higher intensity than their 
primary losses would suggest. Thirty years ago terrorists could not have obtained 
extraordinary leverage. Today, however, the foci of communications, production and 
distribution are relatively small in number and highly vulnerable.” 77 The 1991 published book 
“Computers at Risk” starts as follows “We are at risk. America depends on computers. They 
control power delivery, communications, aviation, and financial services. They are used to 
store vital information, from medical records to business plans to criminal records. Although 
we trust them, they are vulnerable – to the effects of poor design and insufficient quality control, 
to accident, and perhaps most alarmingly, to deliberate attack. The modern thief can steal more 
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with a computer than with a gun. Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more damage with a 
keyboard than with a bomb.”78 
Major malicious cyber operations that have caught great media appeal, such as, I LOVE YOU 
virus79, Estonia 2007 cyber attack80, NotPetya81, WannaCry82, SolarWinds cyber attack83, 
Stuxnet worm84, have shown the significance of cyberattacks, and thus acts of potential 
cyberterrorism. On the other hand, major terrorism incidents, e.g. 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing85,  9/11 attacks86, 2005 London bombings87, 2011 Norway attacks88 or Charlie Hebdo 
attack in 201589, Sri Lanka Easter bombings90, to name few, have demonstrated the world the 
significance of the threat of terrorism. According to GTA in 2019 there were approximately 
8500 terrorist attacks around the world which killed more than 20300 people.91 
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The threats of cyberterrorism have also been illustrated with some incidents occurred. For 
example, in 2000, the Japanese Aum Shinryko cult’s, the same group that was behind the 1995 
Tokyo subway attack92, software was used in 150 police vehicles which enabled the cult to  
receive classified tracking data on 115 vehicles. The Cult had also developed software for at 
least 80 Japanese firms and 10 government agencies and could have installed Trojan horses to 
launch or facilitate cyber terrorist attacks.93  
As well, after the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden allegedly stated that “hundreds of Muslim 
scientists were with him who would use their knowledge [...] ranging from computers to 
electronics against the infidels.” Frank Cilluffo of the Office of Homeland Security has 
famously commented that “[w]hile bin Laden may have his finger on the trigger, his 
grandchildren may have their fingers on the computer mouse”.94 
Thus, cyberterrorism is an increasingly worrisome issue. Nevertheless the realness and the 
significance of the threat of cyberterrorism, the world is still lacking a comprehensive definition 
of cyberterrorism. The term is often overused or misused by popular media but a good 
operational definition is still lacking. The lack of common sense in the definition of 
cyberterrorism risks the threat, once fully materialized, to emerge into major horror to 
humanity. A main obstacle for creating a definition of cyberterrorism is, consequently, the lack 
of an agreed-upon definition of terrorism.95 
1.3. Legal definitions 
The only global treaty on terrorism that contains the definition of terrorism is the 1937 League 
of Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Article 1(2) of the 1937 
Convention defines "acts of terrorism" as "criminal acts directed against a state" that must be 
"intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group 
of persons or the general public".96 The Convention includes a psychological element to the 
definition but does not define the purpose of the state of terror or fear generated.97 Nor did the 
Convention address the issue of people’s self determination and independence movements not 
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to be qualified as terrorism. This treaty never entered into force because it received only one 
ratification, however, this definition laid the foundation for the definitions used in subsequent 
instruments.  
In the 1991 Resolution, the United Nations General Assembly significantly reaffirmed “the 
inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial and racist 
and other forms of alien domination” and recognized that the fight against terrorism could be 
enhanced with the definition of terrorism. Preceding resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly focused on measures to eliminate international terrorism and study of its underlying 
causes, but did not aim to define the phenomen itself. In the 1994 Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism, the General Assembly qualified terrorism as a grave 
violation of the purpose and principles of the United Nations and characterized terrorism as 
unjustifiable (not justifiable on the basis of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or any other nature) criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terror in general 
public. This was the same language used in the 1937 Convention.98  
The 1996 ILC Draft Code defined international terrorism as “undertaking, organizing, 
facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts of violence against another State directed 
at persons or property and of such nature as to create a state of terror (fear or dread) in the 
minds of the public figures, groups of persons or the general public in order to compel the 
aforesaid State to grant advantages or to act in a specific way”.99 
The 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism refers to terrorism as 
acts listed in the sectoral instruments or, referring to the context of armed conflict, as “[a]ny 
other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person 
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of 
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or 
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.100 
These international instruments, although officially interpreted the concept, did not provide 
comprehensive definition of international terrorism nor solved the issue with the struggle of 
peoples for national liberation and independence not falling under the scope of terrorism.  
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Nevertheless, international community has adopted a long list of sectoral instruments on 
terrorism, which could feed to the generic definition. These instruments provide workable and 
pragmatic solutions to the specific acts of terrorism, like hijacking or nuclear terrorism.101 
Without an universal definition, regional organisations and national governments have adopted 
different approaches to fight against terrorism. In 2002, with framework decision 
2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, all EU Member States agreed on the 
common definition of terrorism that would be used in national legislations.102 That definition is 
also enshrined in the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.103 
Notably, the decision also included incitement (including indirect incitement) to commit a 
terrorist offence under the scope of terrorism which was the first attempt by international law 
to define incitement to terrorism.104 The decision was amended in 2008 with the decision 
2008/919/JHA105, in response to the growing terrorist threat and the use of new technologies 
(such as the Internet), and added provisions on public provocation and incitement (with 
reference to the Security Council resolution 1624). The definition leaves the scope of terrorism 
still open, but requires member states to implement the offence in a way that it respectable of 
human rights (including the right to freedom of expression).106 
The UK and the US have passed legislation to specifically fight against cyberterrorism. 
Pursuant to the US’s and the UK’s legal framework, cyberterrorism is treated as an act of 
terrorism, as a special kind of cyber crime. Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) 
contains the following definition: “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The latter definition of terrorism 
does not distinguish means or tools used to conduct the act of terrorism, thus covers 
cyberterrorism under its provision. 107 In 2001, the US passed a Patriot Act that encompasses 
 
101 R. Värk. 2011, pp. 79-80. 
102 UNODC. The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. New York. 2012, p. 22. Available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf; 
V. Ekstedt, T. Parkhouse, D. Clemente. National Cyber Security: Framework Manual. Commitments, 
Mechanisms and Governance. Gen. ed. A Klimburg. NATO CCD COE. Tallinn. 2012, 
p. 157. 
103  V. Ekstedt, T. Parkhouse, D. Clemente. National Cyber Security: Framework Manual. 2012, p. 
157. 
104 Ibid, p. 157. 
105 The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. 2012, p. 23. 
106 V. Ekstedt, T. Parkhouse, D. Clemente. National Cyber Security: Framework Manual. 2012, p. 157. 
107 M. Conway. 2007, p. 16. 
 19 
acts of cyberterrorism.108 According to the UK’s updated (in February 2001) Terrorism Act an 
act of terrorism includes “the use of or threat of action that is designed to seriously interfere 
with or seriously disrupt an electronic system”.109  
According to the Japanese national approach cyberterrorism aims at “seriously affecting 
information systems of private companies and government ministries and agencies by gaining 
illegal access to their computer networks and destroying data.”110 Moscow-based ITAR-TASS 
news agency states that, in Russia, cyberterrorism is perceived as “the use of computer 
technologies for terrorist purposes.”111 Yael Shahar, Web master at the International Policy 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism, located in Israel, differentiates between a number of different 
types of information terrorism, these are: (1) electronic warfare that occurs when hardware is 
the target; (2) psychological warfare that has the goal of inflammatory content; (3) hacker 
warfare that degenerates into cyberterrorism.112 
Leaving it up to national governments to define and criminalise terrorism, means that countries 
have very different approaches to this international crime and it is challenging to distinguish 
the crime among different political and legal systems. Thus it is difficult to distinguish which 
violent attacks against a government may be legitimate (i.e. national liberation, independence 
and self-determination movements against colonial and racist or other forms of alien 
domination and occupational regimes or systems), or to simply fight against international 
terrorism in an effective way. Applying this approach means that, for example, the African 
National Congress that conducted violent actions against South Africa’s apartheid government 
but commanded broad sympathy in the international community, could be considered terrorists. 
Another example that could, with applying this approach, fall under the category of terrorism 
is the Resistance movement against the Nazi occupation of France during World War II.113 Up 
to this day, the international community has not found a way to differentiate these two with an 
universal definition and has, thus, failed to provide a comprehensive global definition of 
terrorism. 
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Although terrorism has been of great concern to international peace and security, the 
international community has struggled to come to a consensus on how to define the term 
“terrorism”. Terrorism is a widely contested phenomena. Nevertheless, some general 
agreements have been reached on the definition of terrorism during peace time, but in times of 
armed conflict a significant dissensions among international community persist (such as 
whether freedom fighters that attack civilians should be labelled as terrorist, instead of war 
criminals, whether a state actions could be classified as terrorism).114 The main obstacle for 
reaching a consensus on the definition is best described with the oft-cited phrase “one person’s 
terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”.  Thus, many countries have been unwilling to 
establish such a universal definition as it might go against their national interests. The absence 
of universally agreed upon definition of terrorism also contributes to legal uncertainty and 
undermines “the states’ credibility and the legitimacy of their conduct in the war on terror”.115 
Another dimension of confusion is then added with the cyber realm. In other words, as the term 
“terrorism” is widely contested, it is even more unclear how to define cyberterrorism. There is 
no international convention that would define and proscribe cyberterrorism.116 
Without a globally agreed upon definition of terrorism, it is even more difficult to say what 
would be an exhaustive list of terror acts in cyberspace, which acts of cyberterrorism amount 
to use of armed force, which acts bring upon an responsibility. Cyberterrorism could refer to 
cyber attacks with certain characteristics to terrorism, or even more broadly, cyberterrorism 
could be any terroristic use of cyberspace. The latter includes also spreading false information, 
propaganda, radicalization, networking, recruiting, online training, financing, command and 
control of attacks, psychological warfare, and cyberattacks117 which can be described as a “tool-
oriented” cyberterrorism”.118 For the purpose of this paper the former approach will be preferred 
as cyber attacks of terrorism raise up vital questions about applicability of international law and 
to also limit the scope of this research. 
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Nietzsche has stated that “[...] it is only that which has no history which can be defined”.119 
Nietzsche argues that any concept, such as terrorism, that has a long history of its own defies 
definition, it simply does not have just one precise meaning. Controversially, the international 
community has also struggled to define operations in cyberspace exactly because it is such a 
new concept and a lot is unclear on how to address issues related to cyberspace, or perhaps 
people do not even want to bind their hands with clear boundaries. In regards to terrorism, it is 
difficult to define it be it due to historical, national, cultural, ethnic standpoints. Geoffrey Levitt 
has said that "the search for legal definition of terrorism is the holy grail" and "periodically, 
eager souls set out, full of purpose, energy and self-confidence, to succeed where many others 
have tried and failed.” Perhaps, then, trying to globally define cyberterrorism, is even more 
holy, and even more doomed to fail. However, international efforts and commitments are 
essential for fighting against this international crime. And through this common fight, perhaps 
even, the international community would develop a more harmonized approach that would 
subsequently seed the global definition on cyberterrorism. Without a universally agreed 
definition of cyberterrorism, international (cyber)terrorism has, nevertheless, still been 
addressed and tackled by international instruments. The next chapter will analyse the legal 
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2. CHAPTER 2: LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CYBERTERRORISM 
Acts of terrorism could be the most grave forms of violence and can indiscriminately target all 
people. The terrorist acts in cyberspace could do the same, or even more so, as the world 
societies are highly and increasingly dependent on ICT infrastructures and the cyber tools are 
convenient tools for terrorists (see Chapter 1, para 1.2.), thus could become increasingly 
preferred means. It is then the most concerning that the legal status of terrorism and 
cyberterrorism in international law stays unclear. To fight against terrorism, effectively 
prosecute terrorists, ensure rule of law and accountability for the acts of terrorism, the 
international community needs to outlaw these acts with comprehensive and effective up-to-
date regulations. Yet there is no binding international legal instrument that would regulate and 
proscribe international cyberterrorism. Nevertheless, acts of cyberterrorism could be 
encompassed by other existing legal instruments. Acts of cyberterrorism can be encompassed 
with specific regulations on cyberterrorism, or a combination of cybercrime and counter-
terrorism legislation (e.g. applying existing cybercrime legislation to the terrorist use of ICTs 
or applying existing counter-terrorism legislation to the acts related to ICT-s), or, counter-
terrorism or criminal acts without differentiating means of conduct (i.e. Internet or ICTs are 
regarded as tools or mediums and not as an individual element of a crime), depending on the 
approach.120 In general, various acts of terrorism are prohibited under international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, international human rights law and, debatably, 
under customary international law.121 This chapter analyses the current legal framework in 
regards to responsibility of cyberterrorism.  
2.1. International law on terrorism 
2.1.1. General instruments 
Although there is no universally accepted binding definition of terrorism, many legal 
instruments regulate and outlaw specific acts of terror (including terrorist acts in cyberspace). 
However, there is no overarching general convention on terrorism, let alone cyberterrorism. 
Already by the 1930s, many bilateral agreements referred to the suppression of terrorism and 
many extradition treaties addressed assassination attempts against Chiefs of State (e.g. 
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Convention on Extradition 1933, article 3 (e)).122 By 1937, a Committee of Experts, established 
by the League Council, drafted a Convention on Terrorism that outlined acts of terrorism that 
State Parties were obliged to criminalize within their domestic laws. The 1937 Convention did 
not enter into force.123 
Since 1972, the United Nations General Assembly (abbr. UNGA) has adopted several (non-
binding) resolutions aimed at eliminating international terrorism, e.g. resolutions in 1972, 1985, 
1987 and 1991. The 1991 resolution confirmed “inalienable right to self-determination and 
independence of peoples under colonial and racist or other forms of alien domination and 
foreign occupation [...]”.124 In 1994 and 1996, the General Assembly adopted the declaration 
on Measures to Eliminate International terrorism, which characterized terrorist acts.125 In 1994, 
the General Assembly reaffirmed that the acts of terrorism are “criminal and unjustifiable, 
wherever and by whomever committed [...]” and stated that “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other 
nature that may be invoked to justify them”.126 
In 2005, a Draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism was presented to 
the UNGA. The draft convention regulates the acts of terrorism by stating the following: 
“Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present Convention if that person, 
by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:  
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or  
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or 
government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the 
environment; or  
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of the 
present article resulting or likely to result in major economic loss;  
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when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act.”127 
Although this definition is an important achievement in trying to establish a general definition 
of terrorism, states still disagree whose actions would be covered by this regulation.128 
Nevertheless, this convention has not been adopted yet, thus its effect is limited with a 
normative value but not a forcible binding effect. 
In 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution called the Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy which includes the Plan of Action and provides Member States with a common 
strategic approach to fight terrorism.129 Pursuant to the Plan of Action, Member States decided, 
inter alia: “[t]o consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes 
one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” and, notably, “[t]o work 
with the United Nations with due regard to confidentiality, respecting human rights and in 
compliance with other obligations under international law, to explore ways and means to “(a) 
Coordinate efforts at the international and regional levels to counter terrorism in all its forms 
and manifestations on the Internet; (b) Use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of 
terrorism, while recognizing that States may require assistance in this regard”. 130 
A new era in the fight against terrorism started with the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the 
USA, after which the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373131 that, inter alia, called up 
states to ban and prevent financing and supporting terrorists. The United Nations Security 
Council has also adopted several key resolutions to further international cooperation in the 
investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of those involved in terrorist acts, 
and to take necessary legislative and other measures to combat terrorism by all Member 
States.132 In its resolution 1624 (2005)133, the Security Council also condemns incitement and 
glorification or justification of terrorist acts, and calls upon all States to prohibit by law. The 
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Security Council resolutions do not provide clear definition of terrorism but condemn some acts 
of terrorism. 
2.1.2. Sectoral instruments 
As there is no overarching regulation on terrorism, notably, the means used for the acts of 
terrorism have an effect on the applicable law.134 Since the 1960s various treaties have banned 
specific acts related to terrorism (e.g. Conventions on the safety of civil aviation, the Hostages 
Convention). A number of different sectoral conventions135, the United Nations auspices and 
specialized agencies, i.e. the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
Maritime Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency provide guidance, and 
address and regulate specific acts of terrorism on the sectoral level. These international 
instruments cover the following terrorist acts: acts of aviation sabotage, acts of violence at 
airports, hijacking of aircrafts, acts against the safety of maritime navigation, acts against the 
safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf, crimes against internationally 
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protected persons (such as the kidnapping of diplomats), acts of unlawful taking and possession 
of nuclear material, acts of hostage-taking, acts of terrorist bombings and acts of funding the 
commission of terrorist acts and terrorist organizations. These instruments are legally binding 
only to the signatories136 as the member states have to enforce provisions of the conventions 
through national jurisdictions.137 
2.1.3. Regional instruments 
In addition to international instruments, regional conventions on terrorism have been adopted 
in Latin America, Europe, by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (abbr. the 
SAARC), and by the Arab States.138 These regional legal instruments aiming to combat 
terrorism are, for instance, the 1971 Organization of American States’ Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion 
that are of International Significance, 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, 1987 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional 
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, 1999 Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999 Convention of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999 Convention of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 2007 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Convention on Counter Terrorism, 2005 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. These regional instruments 
complement and provide useful legal frameworks, yet they do not replace international 
instruments that can be utilized outside a particular geographical region and provide means to 
cooperate internationally.139 
As there is no universally agreed upon definition of terrorism, there is also no comprehensive 
United Nations instrument on terrorism with an exhaustive list of the manifestations of 
terrorism. Thus, the international legal framework on terrorism is scattered and has developed 
along sectoral (or regional) lines, criminalizing specific acts of terrorism without searching for 
consensus on the broader concept of terrorism. The crimes outlined by these instruments do 
not, however, constitute crimes under international law. These are crimes under domestic laws 
as the member states will incorporate these crimes under national legislation. These instruments 
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support cooperation to enable States parties to either prosecute and extradite the alleged 
offenders.140 
2.2. International law on cyberterrorism    
No universal convention has been adopted specifically relating to the terrorist use of 
cyberspace. Furthermore, international law that regulates and addresses traditional attacks, 
targets, weapons, and effects, does not explicitly mention “cyber”. Thus, an analogy is 
primarily used to apply international law in the cyber context.141 However, due to the spread of 
technology, cyberspace has also been used for malicious acts.  
Although not explicitly through international law per se, the international community has still 
addressed the issue of cyberterrorism through different channels. Since 1990, the United 
Nations General Assembly has addressed the issue of cybercrime and has adopted respective 
resolutions (1990 resolution dealing with computer crime legislation and 2000 and again in 
2002 resolutions dealing with criminal misuse of ICT. These resolutions encouraged countries 
to revise their penal codes - e.g. in 1997, Russia updated its penal code by addressing cyber 
crime, IT crime, and cyberterrorism. 142 
United Nations reports and resolutions following the 2001 General Assembly resolution 1373, 
have specifically addressed the importance of countering terrorist use of the Internet. In the 
UNGA Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, member states were encouraged to explore the 
means and ways the Internet is used by terrorists and also how to use the tools of the Internet 
for countering the spread of terrorism. In 2001, Security Council labelled international terrorism 
as a threat to peace.143 2010 resolution 1923144, the Security Council has expressed “concern at 
the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists of new information and communications 
technologies, in particular the Internet, for the purposes of the recruitment and incitement as 
well as for the financing, planning and preparation of their activities”.  
While the current international law does not provide sufficient guidance and clarity for 
cyberterrorism, the existing legal framework of international law is applicable to acts 
committed in and through cyberspace as international law is written broad enough to 
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incorporate new concepts, technology, and terminology.145 The applicability of international 
law to cyberspace was confirmed with a 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (abbr. UN 
GGE) landmark report146 (and further elaborated with the 2015 report147). These reports 
elaborate on how international law applies to cyberspace, propose norms, rules and principles 
for the responsible behaviour of States and suggest capacity and confidence building measures. 
In the 2015 report, UN GGE also warned that “The use of ICTs for terrorist purposes, beyond 
recruitment, financing, training and incitement, including for terrorist attacks against ICTs or 
ICT-dependent infrastructure, is an increasing possibility that, if left unaddressed, may 
threaten international peace and security.“ The 2015 report provides 11 voluntary, non-binding 
norms of responsible State behaviour, including the rules such as “States should not knowingly 
allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”, states “should not 
conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under international law 
that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of 
critical infrastructure to provide services to the public”, and states “should take appropriate 
measures to protect their critical infrastructure from ICT threats”, as well as rules on 
cooperation, assistance and prosecuting terrorists.148 UN GGE will release a new report in 2021. 
In parallel, the General Assembly has also established The Open-Ended Working Group (abbr. 
OEWG) to also provide guidance on the application of international law on cyberspace, 
including to develop the rules, norms, and principles of responsible behaviour of states, discuss 
ways for their implementation, and, in addition, to study the possibility of establishing a regular 
institutional dialogue with broad participation under the auspices of the UN.149 In March, the 
OEWG released its third substantive report.150 In the third report the OEWG, inter alia, 
addressed the potential threat of cyberterrorism, stating that “[t]he continuing increase in 
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incidents involving the malicious use of ICTs by State and non-State actors, including terrorists 
and criminal groups, is a disturbing trend. Some non-State actors have demonstrated ICT 
capabilities previously only available to States.” 
Although the international community has agreed that international law applies to cyberspace, 
it remains unclear how exactly it applies. For example, what kind of cyber operations constitute 
an armed attack, how does the LOAC apply to cyber operations against civilian data, can 
malware be seen as a weapon, and what are legal and illegal cyber weapons. There are 
significant differences between the countries, but also within countries’ different agencies, in 
how a cyber attack is defined.151 In a 2020 statement to the UN Security Council, the ICRC 
President Peter Maurer emphasized on the need for greater clarity on how international law 
applies to cyber operations against critical infrastructure.152 To this end, for example, an 
academic guidance, the Cyber Law Toolkit has been established to provide guidance on the 
uncertainty about the application of international law in cyberspace.153   
In 1998, The Council of Europe (abbr. EC) released guidelines on cyber crime which included 
a policy to counter computer crime and terrorism and the mechanisms necessary to achieve this 
without constraining the fast development of e-commerce in the EU or affecting the right to 
privacy. The guideline calls up for a harmonization of member states' laws.154 On the 23rd of 
November 2001, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Cybercrime which came 
into effect in 2004.155 The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime (aka Budapest 
Convention) is the first and only multilateral binding instrument to regulate cybercrime. Crimes 
regulated under the treaty are ones in which targeted ICTs. The Budapest Convention, inter 
alia, requires parties to criminalize certain acts under domestic law that may lead to the 
commission of terrorist offenses, such as public provocation, recruitment and training, all of 
which may be committed through the Internet.156 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (abbr. OECD) has also released 
Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks. These Guidelines consist of 
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nine principles that aim to increase public awareness, education, information sharing and 
training to enhance understanding of online security and the adoption of best practices.157  
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has promoted cybersecurity within the Asia-
Pacific region and addressed the threats posed by cyber crimes and terrorism. In their Statement 
on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, APEC Leaders collectively committed to: 
endeavour to enact a comprehensive set of laws relating to cyber security and cyber crime that 
are consistent with the provisions of international legal instruments.158  
In 2006, the ASEAN Regional Forum released a statement that called up its members to adopt 
cybercrime and cyber security laws “in accordance with their national conditions and should 
collaborate in addressing criminal and terrorist misuse of the Internet”. In 2009 were these 
recommendations codified within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (ASEAN-China 
Framework Agreement) on information security.159 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a United Nations specialized agency for 
information and communication technologies, Constitution Article 33 recognizes the right of 
the public to use the International Telecommunication Service, Article 45 prohibits harmful 
interference of services mentioned in the article, but the Constitution also provides the right for 
a member state to stop telecommunications pursuant to Article 34 or suspend services pursuant 
to Article 34.160 ITU has released the Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation (2010) to promote 
harmonized national cybercrime legislation and procedural rules, including with respect to acts 
of terrorism committed by using the Internet or the transmission of malware with the intent of 
furthering terrorism. While the Toolkit mainly focuses on cybersecurity issues, it also contains 
several provisions for the criminalization of specific acts of terrorism involving the use of the 
Internet, such as section 3 (f) which addresses unauthorized access to computer programs and 
the transmission of malware for purposes of terrorism.161 
The Council of European Union framework decision 2002/475/JHA162 of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism requires Member States to ensure that terrorist offenses are effectively 
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prosecuted, and outlines specific measures with regard to victims of terrorist offenses. The 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism has similar provisions on 
terrorism offenses. The 2008 decision provides a basis for prosecuting the intentional 
dissemination of terrorist propaganda and bomb-making expertise through the Internet. The 
decision 2008/919/JHA, similar to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism, while not being an Internet-specific instrument, the offenses covered with the 
instrument also cover activities conducted by means of the Internet.163  Since 2013 the EU has 
issued documents on EU strategy on cybersecurity which have inter alia addressed concerns 
about terrorist threats on essential services.164  
Internationally, the cybersecurity strategy is a very scattered topic. Even in the EU, countries 
have developed diverse national cybersecurity strategies and have quite different views on a 
variety of matters, including how to apply international law to cyberspace. The ambiguity is 
even greater in regards to cyberterrorism. The contextual unclarity and scatteredness in the legal 
framework might affect the accountability of cyberterrorism and undermine the efforts to tackle 
modern terrorism and hold the new generation of terrorists responsible. Thus, the international 
community is not only lacking a coherent and operative security strategy, but also a 
comprehensive and effective legal framework and a common sense on the topic of 
cyberterrorism to support the efforts. One of the main obstacles of the international approach 
on cyberterrorism is, yet again, an absence of a universally agreed definition of terrorism. Thus 
states have adopted different judicial and strategic approaches on the issue. 
2.3. Ius ad bellum 
The 1945 Charter of the United Nations articles and principles regulate acts of  cyberterrorism. 
The Charter is found to be applicable to the new features and dynamics posed by cyberspace, 
however the precise scope and content is up for interpretation.165 One of the fundamental 
principles of international law is sovereignty pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the United Nations 
Charter. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the 1928 Island of Palmas case stated that 
„Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to 
a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the 
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functions of a state“.166 UN GGE 2013 report (and reiterated in the 2015 report) confirms that 
sovereignty applies to cyberspace: „State sovereignty and International norms and principles 
that flow from sovereignty apply to state conduct of ICT-related activities [...]“ and adding that 
„in the use of ICTs, States must observe, among other principles of International law, State 
sovereignty, sovereign equality [...]“.167 The second pre-draft of the OEWG Report (May 2020) 
reiterates that „[s]pecific principles of the UN Charter highlighted include state sovereignty; 
sovereign equality [...]“.168  
Rule 1 of the Tallinn Manual (first edition) interprets the principle of sovereignty in regards to 
cyberspace by stating that “[a] State may exercise control over cyber infrastructure and 
activities within its sovereign territory”.169 Rule 4 of the Tallinn Manuals also touches upon the 
principle of sovereignty. Rule 4 of the Tallinn Manual (first edition) states that any interference 
with cyber infrastructure that enjoys sovereign immunity, constitutes a violation of 
sovereignty.170 Rule 4 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 states that a State must not conduct cyber 
operations that violate the sovereignty of another State.171 The acts of cyberterrorism could 
violate sovereignty by, for example, attacking essential services of the state or interfering into 
election systems. 
According to the UN GGE 2013172 and 2015 reports173 and OEWG 2020 report174, due diligence 
also applies to cyberspace. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1949 Corfu channel 
case, explained due diligence of states by stating that it is “every state’s obligation not to allow 
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knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states“.175 According 
to the UN GGE 2015 report176, “states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for 
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs“ and the 2020 OEWG report177 elaborated further that 
“states must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, and should 
seek to ensure that their territory is not used by non-state actors to commit such acts”.  In the 
cyber context, due diligence means that a state must not allow its territory, or territory or cyber 
infrastructure under its control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of, and 
produce serious adverse consequences for other states.178 Rule 5 of the Tallinn Manual states 
that States shall not knowingly allow their cyber infrastructure to be used for acts that adversely 
and unlawfully affect other States.179 Thus, state have a due diligence obligation not to let their 
infrastructure to be used also by cyberterrorists. 
A derivative principle of sovereignty, non-intervention (enshrined in Article 2(7) of the 
Charter), is also applicable to cyberspace and to cyberterrorism. The ICJ, in the 1986 Nicaragua 
case, explained the principle as „a prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which each state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide 
freely”.180 There are two elements of the principle of non-intervention: 1) domain reservé, i.e. 
matters the state is permitted to decide freely are choice of the political, economic, social and 
cultural system, formulation of foreign policy (elections, language policy, the structure of 
governance, the terms of treaties); 2) coercion, i.e. acts that deprive another state of freedom of 
choice causing another state to act in a way it otherwise would not or refraining from acting in 
a way that it otherwise would act (threaten treaty violation to achieve election result).  
Another derivative principle of international law is prohibition of use of force. The prohibition 
of the use of force in international law, as set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, operates 
exclusively between states. According to Article 2(4) “all Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
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Nations.” In the cyber context, it is not the target or tool used that determines whether the use 
of force threshold has been crossed, but rather, the consequences of the operation and its 
surrounding circumstances and whether the consequences are comparable with those of a 
conventional armed attack (e.g. has physical damage or loss of life, or serious disruption to the 
functioning or stability of the state occurred).181 Cyberattack and whether it is considered a use 
of force (as defined by the Law of Armed Conflict) and a casus belli, has different 
interpretations around the world with some countries being more ambiguous of the term’s scope 
than others.182 
This general prohibition of the use of force has two exceptions, i.e. the use of force in self-
defence (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter) and a Security Council authorization of force 
(Article 42 of the United Nations Charter), in a case when the use of force is necessary for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security (Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter). Article 51 requires an “armed attack” to be attributable to a state, thereby 
engaging its responsibility. The use of force is permitted only in case of self-defence of a state, 
or the UN Security Council declares a situation as a threat to international peace and security.183 
How international (cyber)terrorism violates the international prohibition of the use of force, 
remains a debatable topic. The UN Security Council has never officially authorized a use of 
force against terrorist threat, although the Council has classified terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security and thus, could then possibly evoke the right of self-defence 
against terrorist threat.184 
In this regard, the US took a position that customary international law to use self-defence 
exception may be extended to military operations against non-state actors (like ones in Syria 
and Iraq). However, some states disagree with extending customary international law to non-
state actors in such a way.185 
In terms of cyberspace, there is a broad agreement that cyber operations that cause similar 
effects as conventional kinetic actions that constitute as uses of force, i.e. death, injury, 
destructions, damage, qualify also as uses of force.186. However, in matters where it is not so 
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apparent whether it could cross the threshold of armed conflict, for example, prolonged denial 
of service attack that does not cause direct consequences to civilians, qualifying cyber 
operations remain unclear. 
Thus sovereignty, including principles of non-intervention, non use of force and due diligence, 
apply to cyberspace. However, it presents an ongoing difficulty to determine how and to what 
extent these principles apply to cyberspace and if and to what extent they are applicable to the 
acts of non-state actors, such as terrorists. 
2.4. Ius in bello 
Acts of terrorism the world has seen conflict with many rules of International Humanitarian 
Law (abbr. IHL, also known as ius in bello or the Law of Armed Conflict), such as the 
prohibition of torture and abuse, prohibition to attack cultural objects and places of worship, 
non-distinction of civilians and military objectives, attacking civilians. In and through 
cyberspace, the acts of terrorism could be even more indiscriminate as the distinction between 
civilian and military objectives is less clear-cut. In the Nuclear Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stated 
that “the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which 
permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to al1 forms of warfare and to al1 kinds 
of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future”.187 Thus, all 
established principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law apply to all forms of lawfare 
and weapons, including cyber warfare and cyber weapons. This, however, raises more questions 
for interpretations. For example, according to the fourth Geneva Convention, it is prohibited to 
attack civilian populations and civilian facilities (such as dams, electric grids, places of 
worship) - the international community has yet to agree on issues such as what are considered 
civilian objects in cyberspace that are subject to the same protection or whether cyber operations 
that disrupt, but do not physically damage systems amount to an attack as defined in IHL.188 
According to the International Humanitarian Law, attacks that utilize means or methods of 
warfare not directed against a specific military objective, or the effects of attacks are not limited 
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in a lawful manner, are unlawful.189 In regards to cyberspace, this means that cyber tools that 
spread and cause damage indiscriminately are prohibited.190 Thus, basic rules of IHL apply to 
cyberspace. These rules are, for example, prohibition to target civilians and civilian objects is 
forbidden; using indiscriminate weapons and attacks; prohibition of disproportionate attack; 
attacking medical services.191 
International Humanitarian Law applies during the international and non-international armed 
conflict (abbr. IAC and NIAC). IAC applies to conflicts between states, whereas NIAC applies 
to conflicts between state and non-state actors. There is a broad agreement that conflicts in Syria 
and Iraq constitute NIAC, thus IHL applies to a non-state actor (ISIS).192 For NIACs, only 
Common Article 3 of the (1949) Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II are applicable. 
The Common Article 3 lays down minimum prohibitions, such as not attacking civilians or 
wounded and sick, and applies to non-state actors directly (regardless of whether the state is a 
signatory).193 Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions for non-
international armed conflicts, specifically outlaws “acts or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population”.194 For international armed 
conflicts Article 51 section 2 of Additional Protocol I is applicable.195 In order to apply these 
articles, on the one hand, a state has to be a signatory to the protocol and, on the other hand, the 
non-state actors have to satisfy the following criteria: (a) they are organized; (2) they are “under 
responsible command”; (3) they “exercise such control over a part of (the state’s) territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol”.196 Thus, IHL would not apply to just any non-state terrorist but the one that has some 
state-like characteristics (like control over some territory, organization, command system). 
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IHL prohibits all acts aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population (art. 51, para. 2, 
Protocol I; and art. 13, para. 2, Protocol II). IHL also proscribes the following acts, which could 
also be considered as terrorist attacks: attacks on civilians and civilian objects (arts. 51, para. 2, 
and 52, Protocol I; and art. 13, Protocol II); indiscriminate attacks (art. 51, para. 4, Protocol I); 
attacks on places of worship (art. 53, Protocol I; and art. 16, Protocol II); attacks on works and 
installations containing dangerous forces (art. 56, Protocol I; and art. 15, Protocol II); the taking 
of hostages (art. 75, Protocol I; art. 3 common to the four Conventions; and art. 4, para. 2b, 
Protocol II); murder of persons not or no longer taking part in hostilities (art. 75, Protocol I; art. 
3 common to the four Conventions; and art. 4, para. 2a, Protocol II). 197 
There is a widespread agreement that cyber operations that have comparable effects to classic 
kinetic operations are governed by IHL applicable in IAC (Tallinn Manual 2.0, rule 82, 
paragraph 16). For example, the destruction of civilian or military assets, or actions that cause 
the death or injury of soldiers or civilians is prohibited both through cyber and conventional 
methods. However, it is uncertain whether cyber operations that do not physically destroy or 
damage military or civilian infrastructure could be considered an armed force governed by IHL 
in the absence of kinetic hostilities. Thus, it remains unclear which cyber operations constitute 
an armed force under IHL.198 
There are several challenges in applying International Humanitarian Law to cyberterrorism, or 
terrorism in general. One is that IHL requires precise classification of conflicts. In practice, it 
is not always easy to make a distinction between IAC and NIAC. Moreover, Sassoli has noted 
that “the law of non-international armed conflicts may appear in certain respects inappropriate 
for a transnational conflict between a state and a global non-state actor, since such law was 
designed for conflicts occurring within a territory”.199 As well, it may be difficult to say when 
the armed conflict has ceased and IHL is no longer applicable. Another troublesome issue in 
regards to applying IHL to (cyber) terrorist attacks, is the distinction between civilian and 
military objectives which in fact lies at the heart of humanitarian law.200 Specifically in regards 
to cyberterrorism, it is unclear whether some cyber tools, targets and consequences are 
permitted or forbidden under IHL. Thus, although International Humanitarian Law does not 
provide a definition of terrorism, it regulates acts of terrorism. However, it remains unclear how 
and to what extent acts of cyberterrorism are covered under International Humanitarian Law. 
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2.5. Customary International Law 
Customary International Law is a framework of unwritten international law that refers to the 
rules and principles of international law established by state practice. Customary International 
Law, being dependent on state practice and changing reality, may adapt more easily to the 
changes in the global realm.201 Customary International Law also addresses terrorist acts, for 
example, in the Galić case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (abbr. 
ICTY), found “that terrorization of civilian population, committed during an armed conflict, 
has crystallized into a war crime under customary international law”.202 The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, the only tribunal that was created specifically to try terrorist cases, was to 
established to prosecute those suspected of assassinating former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri203, in fact found that a definition of terrorism exists under customary international law 
(based on UN Resolutions and the legislative and judicial practice of States).204 The tribunal 
also provided an international definition of terrorism. Pursuant to the Appeals Chamber of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, terrorism has three core elements: (1) the commission of a 
criminal conduct (like murder or hostage-taking); (2) the intent (dolus specialis) to spread fear 
in the population or influence decision making of national or international authority and the 
intent (dolus) of the underlying crime; (3) the act has a transnational element.205 This decision 
has been widely criticized for broadening international law, thus, the existence of terrorism 
under customary international law remains a debatable matter.206 
Although the UN treaties and resolutions do not constitute as customary international law, they 
indicate the state practice and consensus of the international community. Thus, for example, the 
UN Security Council resolution 1373 indicates prohibition of terrorism under customary 
international law. Special acts of terrorism, such as genocide or torture, would also be prohibited 
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applicable to non-state actors.208 Although customary international law is susceptible to 
changing the world, it is also difficult to identify new rules of customary international law.209 
Emergence of customary international law requires constant, uniform and general settled state 
practice, and a conviction by states that such practice shall be deemed obligatory (creates legal 
rights or obligations).210 However, emergence of customary international law on terrorism and 
its definition, is unlikely, as global community continues to disagree as states have not been 
able to agree to adopt a generic treaty on international terrorism.211 
Some rules of customary international law are less adaptable to changes, these are peremptory 
norms of international law or ius cogens norms. These norms, for example, prohibit genocide, 
torture, slavery and use of force contrary to the United Nations Charter.212 The principles of 
customary international law that have also been codified in treaty law, are intervention, use of 
force, due diligence, state responsibility and these are principles that could also apply to the 
acts of cyberterrorism (see above).  
2.6. State Responsibility 
States have a positive obligation to protect, a responsibility for security, ensuring rights and 
freedoms of its citizens. One of the threats to those aims is terrorism. Apart from conventional 
kinetic attacks, government institutions and service providers are threatened by cyberattacks 
and disinformation campaigns intended to radicalize or shift the political narrative. Digital 
means and targets could keep terrorists from having to face accountability for their actions. If, 
for example, an jihadist terrorist would want to target a Western society, it would be beneficial 
for them to attack one of the weakness points, which could be some (essential) ICT systems the 
Western society is reliant on. The terrorist might be encouraged to launch such cyberattack with 
perceived impunity through the geographical and legal disconnect.213 States may bear 
responsibility for cyberterrorism if it also has sufficient linkage (e.g. if a state directs an act of 
cyberterrorism) to the act itself. 
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State responsibility (for cyberterrorism) is governed with Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of States of Internationally Wrongful Acts (abbr. ARSIWA), a “modern framework for State 
responsibility”214, which regulate when and how states are held responsible for breaches of an 
international obligation. These rules also establish in which cases an act of an official or an 
individual is attributed to the state. Thus, states that do not conduct but sufficiently support 
(through the concept of agency) terrorist activities may become responsible for the acts of 
terrorism.215 
A state bears responsibility, if: (1) an internationally wrongful act has been committed (Article 
1 of ARSIWA); (2) the conduct (action or omission) is attributable: (Article 2 of ARSIWA); 
(3) Conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State (Article 2 of 
ARSIWA).216 Apart from wrongful actions, not fulfilling its due diligence obligation constitutes 
an internationally wrongful omission by a State.217 In Bosinan Genocide case the breach of the 
obligation to prevent genocide constituted the wrongful act.218 State should also not provide 
safe haven for cyberterrorists as the United Nations Security Council has insisted that states 
must “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts”.219 For the 
elaboration on due diligence obligations, see para. 2.3.  
State involvement could constitute direction or control of an attack, support (i.e. financing, 
providing equipment, training, transportation), toleration or inaction, however, not any 
connection with terrorism involves responsibility.220 According to the UN GGE 2013 report, 
“States must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts 
attributable to them”.221 According to the UN GGE 2015 report “States must meet their 
international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them under 
international law. However, the indication that an ICT activity was launched or otherwise 
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originates from a State’s territory or from its ICT infrastructure may be insufficient in itself to 
attribute the activity to that State. The Group noted that the accusations of organizing and 
implementing wrongful acts brought against States should be substantiated”.222 
State involvement could also be more direct as a state may prefer (to take advantage of 
international legal loopholes, minimize the responsibility) to choose conduct an act of 
cyberterrorism instead of conducting a conventional armed attack.223 To identify sufficient 
control or direction, an overall or effective control test shall be used.224 The former requires a 
state to be involved in the planning, direction, support and execution of the terrorist act.225 The 
latter requires a state to have an overall control over a terrorist action, thus the state does not 
have to issue specific orders or instructions to every specific act of terrorism.226 
According to Article 11 of ARSIWA, the state could be responsible for the act of 
cyberterrorism, if it acknowledges and adopts the act as its own. 
It is important to identify state involvement (one of the abovementioned) to justify the use of 
self-defence. According to Article 8 of ARSIWA, using self-defence (according to Article 39 
of the UN Charter) in case of an attack (or a threat of such), there has to be an imminent threat 
from a state. That means that the act of cyberterrorism has to be linked to some state which is a 
difficult task for law enforcement.227 
In the case of Stuxnet, a cyber operation against Iranian nuclear technologies (critical 
infrastructure), it is apparent that these kinds of cyber weapons are so sophisticated and linked 
to state actors and their proxies.228  In this case, if a sufficient linkage has been identified 
between the state and the act of terrorism, state responsibility could be raised. 
2.7. International Human Rights Law  
Human rights obligations form an integral part of the international legal counter-terrorism 
framework, both through the obligation imposed on States to prevent terrorist attacks, which 
have the potential to significantly undermine human rights, and through the obligation to ensure 
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that all counter-terrorism measures respect human rights. On the other hand International 
Human Rights Law (abbr. IHRL) could also be applied to the acts of terrorism, which have 
devastating effects on the enjoyment of individual human rights. However, according to ECHR, 
the acts of terrorism can only go against states as states have obligations to protect civilians 
against terrorists, compensate for terror acts, shall not engage in terror acts. The applicability 
of IHRL to non-state actors, is a debatable issue, as traditionally, it has been regulating the 
relationship between the state and individuals.229 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (abbr. 
UNODC), in the 2009 report, rejected the applicability of IHRL to terrorist, stating that 
“international human rights instruments govern the responsibilities of States with regard to the 
individual, not the criminal responsibility of terrorist individuals and organizations”.230 Bellal, 
a legal advisor at the humanitarian organization Geneva Call, on the contrary, suggests that 
IHRL applies to armed groups that have achieved de facto authority with state-like functions.231 
It is also debated whether IHRL is also applicable during armed conflict, whether IHRL 
complements IHL during armed conflicts or the applicability of IHL excludes the applicability 
of IHRL.232 In case IHRL is applicable to non-state actors, IHRL would impose several legal 
obligations on terrorists.233 This would mean enhancing terrorist organizations to state-like 
organizations, but would also provide greater means to hold terrorists accountable for the 
violations of human rights.234 
States can be held responsible for violations of their international human rights obligations 
which include a duty to protect people from acts of terrorism (e.g. inadequate criminal 
legislation to govern the terrorism or failure to act to prevent the activities of terrorism). States, 
thus, have a positive obligation to, inter alia, establish  an effective criminal justice system 
within the rule of law to combat impunity for terrorists.235 States may also face responsibility 
for the acts of terrorism if it has some linkage to the acts236 
As mentioned above, IHRL also prescribes that counter-terrorism measures respect human 
rights. This however raises many debates (see, for example, burqa and other face coverings 
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bans, such as in Switzerland237, Sri Lanka238, Case S.A.S v. France Judgment239), such as private 
versus collective rights, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, religion, conscience, 
association, discrimination, right to privacy versus right (and state’s obligation) to security, 
debates on content regulations.240 Fighting against terrorism, developing laws criminalizing the 
incitement of acts of terrorism and regulating cyberspace, whilst protecting human rights (such 
as the rights to freedom of expression and association, or religion) is a challenge for 
policymakers, legislators, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors.   
2.8. International Criminal Law 
2.8.1. Crimes applicable to terrorism 
In 1937 the League of Nations adopted Convention that would establish International Criminal 
Court to try terrorist offences according to the 1937 Terrorism Convention, however this never 
came to force.241 The successor of the League of Nations, the United Nations took a broader 
approach to establish a permanent international criminal court.242 Subsequently, international 
terrorism was left out from the Statute of International Criminal Court. Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (abbr. ICC) is the latest and the greatest development in the field 
of international criminal law, yet it has not been used for the purpose of trying cases of 
terrorism. The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, outlaws the most serious 
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression, yet it 
does not include terrorism, as a distinct, sui generis offence, within its jurisdiction.243 However, 
the ICC may try cases of terrorism if they amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, i.e. crimes the Court has jurisdiction over.244 The International Law Commission (the 
UN agency responsible for codification of international law) itself has stated in the Draft Statute 
for an International Criminal Court that some acts of terrorism could qualify a crimes against 
humanity and genocide: “A systematic campaign of terror committed by some groups against 
the civilian population would fall within the category of crimes under general international law 
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in subparagraph (d), and if motivated on ethnic or racial grounds, also subparagraph (a)”.245 
In the context of armed conflict, some acts of terrorism, could also be qualified as war crimes. 
Terrorism may fall under the category of war crime as unlawful attacks against civilians with 
the additional specific intent of spreading terror among the civilian population.  
In cases before the ICTY (Galić and Milošević cases) and SCSL (Brima and Charles Taylor 
cases), terrorism has been considered a war crime, i.e. unlawful attacks against civilian 
population with the additional specific intent of spreading terror among civilians.246 In Galić 
case, an international tribunal for the first time convicted an accused for the crime of “acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population”.247 War crimes are serious violations of the laws applicable during (international 
or non-international) armed conflict that evoke individual criminal responsibility. 248 War 
crimes (and grave breaches of IHL) are governed under treaty-based and customary IHL, 
whereas terrorism is regulated by reference to a number of complex, sectoral, offence-based 
instruments (see above).249 In order for an act of cyberterrorism to fall under category of war 
crimes, it has to take place in the context of armed conflict. 
Specific acts of terrorism may also fall under category of crimes against humanity.250 In Galić 
case, the accused was also found guilty of crimes against humanity.251 Crimes against humanity 
constitute a serious attack on human dignity, grave humiliation or a degradation of people.252 
Crimes against humanity require an act of terrorism to be widespread or systematic attack 
against civilians, irrespective of time of war or peacetime.253 These crimes include, for example, 
murder, torture or other inhumane acts (for example enslavement, rape, sexual slavery, or 
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender).254 Thus, for the act of terrorism to fall under category of crimes 
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against humanity it has to be sufficiently widespread or systematic conduct of violence listed 
under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.255 
Cohen states that “crimes against humanity are arguably the most suitable format to prosecute 
terrorist acts although they also require [...] a widespread or systematic attack and, thus, raise 
the threshold for the more common isolated terrorist acts”.256 
Acts of terrorism could also fall under category of genocide when the terrorist acts has the 
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” 
and a crime listed in the sections (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Article 6 of the Rome Statute 
has been conducted.257 
International Criminal Law is applicable during armed conflicts and during peacetime.258 
Although in certain circumstances, acts of (cyber)terrorism could be tried as crimes under the 
Rome Statute, there is no international criminal jurisdiction of (cyber) terrorism.259 “Hence, 
under the current ICC list of crimes, the effects of terrorism can be prosecuted, but not the act 
of terror itself”.260 Whether an act of terrorism constitutes a crime under the ICC statute depends 
on the criteria of these crimes lists, relevant aspects to consider are number of people affected 
(killed, injured, kidnapped), location of attacks, type of attack (armed assault, hijacking, the 
scale on an attack including gravity, character, lethality, spread, rapidly, duration, persistence 
of attack, geographic scope, etc. There has been unsuccessful attempts (in 1998 and 2010) to 
include terrorism as a separate distinct crime under the ICC Statute.261 Although there is a gap 
in the legal framework to try terrorist cases, current existing legal framework is still used by the 
ICC to investigate, prosecute and try alleged offenders designated as terrorist.262 
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2.8.2. Individual responsibility 
The International Criminal Court (abbr. ICC) may only prosecute individuals (not organisations 
or states), according to the principle of complementarity, the ICC may only prosecute if the 
state is unable or unwilling to genuinely investigate and prosecute its nationals. In order to 
prosecute nationals of a state, the state has to have ratified the Rome Statute or the UN Security 
Council has to give the jurisdiction to try the case to the ICC. Alternatively, international 
criminal law could also be applied at the national level by states.263 
States may also prosecute individuals based on extraterritorial jurisdiction or universal 
jurisdiction.264 The ICRC explains “under the principle of universal jurisdiction, war crimes 
suspects may be criminally prosecuted not only by the state in which the crime occurred, but 
by all states”.265 In regards to fighting terrorism, this expanded jurisdiction under international 
law is controversial and may undermine international law. For example, the US does not 
recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction over its own nationals but can exercise jurisdiction over foreign 
individuals who have committed offences outside the US. Such selective approaches to 
international jurisdiction over terrorist may undermine international law.266 
In practice, bringing terrorists to justice remains troublesome. In addition to difficulties in 
collecting admissible evidence and taking terrorists into custody, there are also some legal 
issues such as too vague international extradition regulations.267  As explained above, terrorist 
cases could be tried in the ICC if all the elements of listed crimes are met. For example, in 2016, 
the ICC sentenced Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi – an Islamic militant who destroyed ancient shrines 
in Timbuktu, and who was a member of Ansar Dine, an al-Qaeda-linked group that controlled 
northern Mali in 2012– to nine years in jail for war crimes against cultural property. 268 
2.9. Responsibility of private entities 
As so-called Information Society seems to be in the constant change whilst the legal systems 
seem to be lacking behind, accepting a more multi-level, multi-stakeholder approach to 
security, governance and delegating some jurisdiction to global ICT-experts and industry (such 
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as ISO, IEC, ITU) to put down general security standards and guidelines, is perhaps a modern 
way forward. Delegating responsibilities or increasing engagement with the industry and 
relevant stakeholders in the matters of Internet governance and cyber security could enhance 
the efforts of fighting international cyber crimes (against or with the use of ICTs). Private sector 
sector plays a crucial role in national cyber security matters, as it conducts research, designs, 
develops and manufactures the vast majority of software and hardware used in ICTs, provides 
online products and services, maintains most of the network infrastructure and often owns the 
critical infrastructure - all of which can be targeted or used to conduct cyberattacks.269 Private 
sector plans and manages resources, provides reliable connectivity, and ensures delivery for 
traffic and services.270 In terms of national cyber security, non-state and international actors are 
as involved as government entities.271 As the private service providers are playing increasingly 
greater roles in Internet governance and security matters, it raises questions like if and what 
kind of responsibilities are they bearing.  
One approach could be that, as private companies are already governing important matters to 
the peace and security, democracy, etc, governments could actively delegate some 
responsibilities to these service providers. Governments or international organisations could lay 
responsibilities for service providers to, for example, secure public spaces by setting minimum 
obligations for operators of public places to ensure the security of shopping malls, transport 
services, places of worship, etc. The authorities could also delegate the responsibility to monitor 
and take down propaganda or other terrorist content. In that sense internet service providers 
would be acting similarly to law enforcement.272 
Depending on the national approach, service providers might play an essential role in regulating 
content and users of their services. In the article “Terrorism and the Internet: should web sites 
that promote terrorism be shut down?”, Barbara Mantel notes that “most Internet service 
providers, web hosting companies, file-sharing sites and social networking sites have terms-of-
service agreements that prohibit certain content”. For example, she notes that Yahoo’s Small 
Business Web hosting service specifically forbids users from utilizing the service to provide 
material support or resources to any organization(s) designated by the United States 
Government as a foreign terrorist organization. To that extent, there is an element of self-
regulation within the information society. Self-regulation by these private sector stakeholders 
may also support countering terrorist communication, incitement, radicalization and training 
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activities conducted on these platforms. In addition, the service providers play a role in timely 
identification of Internet activity that may promote acts of terrorism.273 
However, a regulatory “techlash”, the monopolization and applying a more authoritarian 
approach in cyberspace with governments making service providers responsible and imposing 
fines on them when not providing sufficient security and possibly breaking them up, could 
contribute to digital inequality as it would be very difficult for smaller companies to operate.274 
E. Macron has in regards to the increased role of private entities in Internet governance,  pointed 
out that the world has given sovereignty to (telecom) companies.275 A lot of control over critical 
digital infrastructure has shifted to the private sector and some governments are now aware and 
alarmed this as this becomes especially problematic if the industry does not deliver what 
governments want in terms of security. Therefore, policymakers should put down requirements 
to follow and standardization (including international standardization) should be revalued as a 
matter of strategic autonomy. To reflect the reality and for the laws, rules and standards to be 
up-to-date and relevant, governments should to that end, cooperate with companies and 
technology experts, and private companies, on the other hand, should cooperate with 
governments to  address their concerns.276 However, some governments have taken a more 
dominant approach in regards to Internet Governance. For matters of international concern and 
that have significant differences in approaches between governments, a greater harmonization 
and common understanding should be pursued. This includes content control and regulation in 
terms of terrorism as regulating terrorism-related content on the Internet is highly contentious. 
Some states apply strict regulatory controls on the Internet and other related service providers 
(including using technologies to filter or block access to some content) while other states have 
adopted a softer regulatory approach, relying to a greater extent on self-regulation by the 
information sector.277 
Another solution could be strengthening the role of the international community in the areas of 
Internet governance. While the level of government regulation of the Internet varies greatly 
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around the world, in the absence of a global authority responsible for Internet regulation, private 
stakeholders continue to dominate a domain that has become essential to all states and by 
controlling the availability of terrorism-related content disseminated via the Internet.278  
Policies and governance play a vital role in mitigating risks and speeding response to cyber 
incidents, however, governance is not always present in information security. The matters of 
cyberterrorism are not limited by national boundaries. In considering effective actions to fight 
against international cyberterrorism,  there is a need for concerted and consistent international 
legislation.279 This means increased cooperation between academia, ICT companies, state and 
nonstate actors, to, inter alia, ensure compliance of nonstate actors in situations of national 
danger, the resilience of the private sector to ensure continuity of its operations.280 
Although, unlike combat in air or at sea, the internet as a domain of conflict is controlled 
overwhelmingly by the private sector, as to this day, the responsibility for countering the use of 
the cyber means for terrorist purposes ultimately lies with member states. To capture threats 
like cyberterrorism that operate in an immersively multi-stakeholder environment, a holistic 
comprehensive approach is needed to effectively fight against such threats. Some international 
efforts have been made to formalize information sharing and cooperation with private entities 
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3. CHAPTER 3: WAYS FORWARD 
As it was shown in the previous chapters, international law encompasses many acts of terrorism 
by different instruments, yet it remains ill-equipped to ensure responsibility for the acts of 
terrorism, or, furthermore, acts of cyberterrorism. There is no explicit delictum juris gentium of 
cyberterrorism. The fragmentation of law and issues with applying international law to the acts 
of cyberterrorism (due to shortcomings with legal definitions, jurisdictional scope and 
procedures for prosecution281), undermines its potential benefits and effectiveness of ensuring 
responsibility for such horrors. In fact, terrorists have taken advantage of legal gaps and the 
lack of international cooperation.282 Thus, international law must be improved to address 
modern global threats and provide a legal framework to effectively bring contemporary 
terrorists to justice. This Chapter purposes some ways forward to ensure responsibility of acts 
of cyberterrorism. 
Greater and clearer understandings of international law in the context of 
cyberterrorism 
Although the international community has been unable or unwilling to agree on the global 
definition of terrorism, greater clarity could be brought to, in addition to the acts of terrorism, 
outlaw acts of cyberterrorism. Even if the world is yet unwilling to agree on a legal 
comprehensive global definition of cyberterrorism, much can be done to prepare and fight 
against cyberterrorism. As well, efforts could be made to create greater common understandings 
and interpretations of international law in regards to cyberspace and crimes committed against 
and through the use of ICTs. International community could interpret the international 
principles, laws and norms further to ensure resilience, stability and accountability, and enhance 
fight against modern terrorism. Global and regional efforts to harmonize laws of terrorism are 
important to overcome legal scatteredness and gaps in the regulations on cyberterrorism. In 
order to bring wrongdoers to justice, the international community needs a political and legal 
clarification for the possible acts of cyberterrorism, prohibit certain cyber operations (including 
terrorist acts in cyberspace), propose possible countermeasures  (such as punishment or reprisal 
attack to the cyberterrorism) and responses (diplomatic response, coordinating attribution, 
judiciary), but also clarify the interpretation of cyber attack and armed response to it, what 
constitutes a legal target in cyberspace, but also on matters like content regulations.283 
Significant progress that has been made by the UN GGE, OEWG, or Tallinn Manual processes 
are essential in seeking to elaborate on the applicability of international law on cyberspace and 
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on cyberterrorism, and subsequently, to overcome the existing legal loopholes and uncertainty 
and to fight against impunity. Nevertheless the important steps that have been taken, the 
international legal framework should still be further elaborated on. 
International counter-terrorism convention 
For the legal framework to be more efficient, the international community could build up from 
the scattered sectoral instruments an international counter-terrorism convention that would, 
inter alia, elaborate the acts of terrorism further in the context of the fifth, global domain (i.e. 
cyber domain). A crucial milestone would also be when the global community would adopt the 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (abbr. CCIT). The draft convention 
would be a pragmatic solution to enhance the international fight against terrorism. It, inter alia, 
includes causing serious damage to telecommunications and information networks as a terrorist 
offence. However, the convention does not specifically elaborate on cyberterrorism and thus 
would have to be still further interpreted. Nevertheless, the acts of cyberterrorism would fall 
under the scope of the draft convention.284  
As terrorism can be disrespectful of national boundaries, in case of cyberterrorism national 
boundaries play even lesser role. Thus, international cyberterrorism is a global threat affecting 
all countries and people and therefore needs a global comprehensive approach. International 
terrorism convention could provide an effective framework to fight against this global threat. 
The international community could also establish a new court, an International Counter-
Terrorism Court to enhance evidence sharing, cooperation and global efforts to ensure 
accountability for these international crimes. The international court, operating based on an 
international convention of terrorism, could therefore overcome the paradox that one person’s 
terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter and ensure accountability for the grave and global 
crimes.285 
The author is in the opinion that the creation of an international court and convention on 
terrorism, that should address modern threats posed by cyberspace, would, indeed, improve the 
fight against terrorism and impunity. However, since the international community still faces 
some obstacles in, for example, reaching consensus on pragmatic workable comprehensive 
definition on cyberspace, this is unlikely to happen any time soon.  
New laws regulating cyberspace 
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David T. Borgeois described the current situation of the rapid development of technologies as 
a “Wild West”-type of atmosphere caused by the fact that the policymakers haven’t kept up 
with the new reality with appropriate laws.286 In addition to applying existing international law 
to cybersecurity issues, the international community could propose new rules, laws and 
principles to fill the gaps that international law is yet lacking. This could be done by adopting 
a convention (see the previous paragraph) but also by adopting revised NIS, updated Budapest 
Convention287, or revised EU’s Cybersecurity Act288, etc. that reflects the modern reality better 
and strengthens international commitments in the fight against (cyber)terrorism. That means 
that both sectoral and regional legal instruments that regulate terrorism, should also be reviewed 
in regards to cyberspace. In the absence of so-called hard-law, non-binding, guidance providing 
instruments such as Tallinn Manuals (including revised Tallinn Manual 3.0) play an important 
role in interpreting existing legal framework in a way that reflects modern reality and threats. 
In addition to new laws, measures and guidance, existing frameworks should also be further 
implemented, strengthened and promoted. 
To ensure accountability of terrorism, national legal frameworks should, inter alia, criminalize 
unlawful acts carried out by terrorists over the Internet or related services, regulate Internet-
related services (e.g. ISPs) and content, provide investigative powers for law enforcement 
agencies engaged in terrorism-related investigations, develop specialized judicial or evidential 
procedures and facilitate international cooperation, whilst maintaining standards of 
international human rights.289 The legislative framework should cover general cybercrime 
legislation (including solicitation and criminal association that might be related to terrorism 
cases), general counter-terrorism legislation and internet-specific counter-terrorism 
legislation.290 
Modernization of international law 
The fight against terrorism must adapt to the new era, the so-called Information Society. In 
order to ensure accountability for acts of cyberterrorism, governments and law enforcement 
must understand the differences between physical terrorism and cyberterrorism and not 
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undermine the latter. Governments must identify threats to their national security that will be 
enshrined in their national security strategies and counter-cyberterrorism plans.291 
To address cyberterrorism, a multilateral response that respects international law and the 
Charter of the United Nations and is responsive to the realities of contemporary issues and a 
globalized world, is required. In order to respond to contemporary threats, a principled, 
inclusive, comprehensive and forward-looking (as provided by the United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy) strategy is needed. International cooperation can support the states 
with their responsibility responses to prevent and counter terrorism. 292  
As well, in terms of international criminal law, modernization if the Rome Statute could be 
sought to hold cyberterrorists accountable. Including terrorism as a distinct crime would 
enhance specifically the prosecution of terrorists. In addition, interpreting the existing Rome 
Statute and enhancing the ICC processes in a way that reflects the modern threat landscape, i.e. 
including cyberattacks and -threats, could also improve ensuring responsibility for the acts of 
cyberterrorism. 
Enhancing cyber resilience against cyberterrorism 
Improving cyber resilience in general contributes to the fight against cyberterrorism and the 
impunity of such. Terrorism is a phenomenon that seeks to divide, to fight against it we need to 
invest in deradicalization processes and unity through social cohesion and inclusion, education, 
multi-stakeholder cooperation, regional and international coordination and information sharing. 
In the context of cyber, there is a need for state institutions and private enterprises to increase 
their cyber resilience. The NATO Member States have in 2010, recognised malicious cyber 
operations “can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security 
and stability”.293 
The most frequent targets of cyber operations are digital services and finance sector, but also 
public sector and manufacturing. However, cyber readiness and awareness among businesses 
and individuals are low.294 As Specops Software cybersecurity expert Darren James said “No 
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one can rest on their laurels when it comes to cybersecurity”295, all companies are suggested to 
continually improve their cybersecurity strategy and modernize their systems in accordance 
with the changing threat landscape. Alongside, governments should adopt necessary 
cybersecurity standards and requirements in compliance with international guidelines and 
obligations. Non-state actors and cybercriminals are increasingly sophisticated in their 
methods, thus service providers and policy, law and decision makers should as well constantly 
enhance their cyber readiness, keep their cyber hygiene high and invest in cybersecurity to also 
address the cyber threats imposed by non-state actors. Protection of core infrastructure and 
essential services is utmost important, to this end revised NIS directive296 could provide 
guidance. Capacity- and confidence building measures to tackle cyberthreats and the threat of 
terrorism should be kept up to date on private, national, regional and international level to 
effectively prevent, deter and respond to cyberterrorism. Law enforcement that fights against 
terrorism, might now in regards to cyber crimes also need a special type of investigative powers 
and cyber capacity specialized investigative techniques for law enforcement and prosecutors.  
In addition, in terms of a global multistakeholder domain (cyberspace) and international crime 
(international terrorism), international multilevel (between governments, private entities, 
milCERTS, civCERTS, etc.) cooperation, information sharing (including in evidence collecting 
and prosecuting terrorists) is crucial. Thus, the international community should also formalize 
the information sharing between governments and private stakeholders.297 
To that end, common understanding on the issues of cyberterrorism should be pursued. 
International action and policy dialogue in the field of cybersecurity has been sought through 
the international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations 
(UN).298 
Through the new Programme of Action for Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in 
Cyberspace, many of such legal and policy means are addressed. The Programme of Actions 
aims to enhance capacity building, develop confidence-building measures, improve 
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coordination among the relevant stakeholders, advancing norms of responsible behaviour and 
understanding how international law specifically applies to cyberspace.299 
Thus, harmonized, clear and strengthened approach towards (cyber)terrorism, continuous 
efforts in the fight against terrorism and addressing new threats imposed by ICTs, are needed 
to hold modern terrorist accountable for their actions. However, there are significant challenges 
in tackling and regulating cyberterrorism - apart from technical attribution and evidential 
challenges, there are significant dissenting opinions and approaches to terrorism and cyber 
operations, including matters related to dual criminality, sharing intelligence based sensitive 
information300, regulating content and the scope of applying international law to cyberspace.  
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CONCLUSION 
Today’s world is more interconnected than ever, mostly because of the widespread use of ICTs. 
We are highly dependent on something that has only come into existence within the last century. 
It has been a fast race somewhere unknown and unpredictable, and people have struggled to 
adapt their conventional laws, systems and thinking which subsequently has created some gaps 
and vulnerabilities in our systems. Perhaps even, the new technologies and spread of them have 
also changed our attitudes, values and ethics - something that changes our ways of interpreting 
conventional rules. New technologies, whether it is inventing aeroplane or gunpowder, or 
digital technologies, present both new opportunities and challenges.301 Information and 
communication technologies can be used by criminals and terrorists to pursue their malicious 
intents, be it social, political or other aims. Global character and interconnectivity of cyberspace 
create a new vulnerability in regard to terrorist threat. It is true that terrorist attacks still mainly 
occur in the physical domain rather than in the cyber domain or against ICT targets and ICTs 
have rather a supporting role in terrorist activities (e.g. providing encrypted communication 
means). Thus, cyberterrorism remains to be a possibility than a proven reality.302 Nevertheless, 
the threats of cyberterrorism persist real and serious.  
Threats posed in cyberspace are of concern to all countries, thus strong commitments to 
international law are evermore important to strengthen the stability and to overcome so called 
Wild West what ICTs brought to the digital society. This thesis focused on the ways of holding 
cyberterrorists responsible and on the applicability of current international law on 
cyberterrorism. In order to do that, the definition of cyberterrorism was explored. Notably, there 
is no universal generic definition of terrorism nor cyberterrorism. In analysing applicable legal 
frameworks that are relevant in regards to cyberterrorism, several challenges to this end were 
identified. There were uncertainties identified in applying related norms of international law - 
sovereignty, use of force, non-intervention, due diligence, but also applying International 
Humanitarian law, Customary International Law, and International Criminal Law in regard to 
the acts of cyberterrorism, as well debates on human rights in regards to cyberterrorism were 
addressed. The nations of the world still have very different approaches to these matters. 
Opinions still dissent on what is meant by terrorism and the clash is increased in relation to the 
new domain and questions around how to regulate it. Thus, nevertheless the common will of 
countries to bring wrongdoers to justice, it is not a simple task. International law and ensuring 
responsibility for the acts of cyberterrorism is therefore bound by the political positions and 
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inclinations. This is also due to the persisting challenges to define terrorism in general – thus, 
the legal framework on international terrorism works rather on a regional or sector-specific 
level. Global and regional efforts to overcome this obstacle were addressed. As well, possible 
remedies to overcome legal loopholes and ways to strengthen the framework of holding 
cyberterrorists responsible, were proposed.  
Therefore, this thesis found that international law is, in fact, ill-equipped to ensure responsibility 
for cyberterrorism. International law should be further interpreted in regards to cyberterrorism. 
An international comprehensive convention on terrorism that reflects the modern threat 
landscape and means, would enhance the fight against terrorism and impunity. As the legal gaps 
were identified, the thesis also proposed ways forward in regard to strengthening responsibility. 
Whether international law is such a call in the desert to provide clarity on the concept of 
cyberterrorism or the stability in cyberspace should be pursued through some other channels, 
remains in question as the views of various states differ drastically. However, international law 
is one of the channels in the holistic fight against (cyber)terrorism. 
Therefore, the value of this thesis to the jurisprudence lies in the elaboration on the conventional 
norms of international law in regard to cyberterrorism and the proposed remedies to strengthen 
the responsibility for cyberterrorism. 
As this thesis focuses on a more general and holistic approach to international law, covering all 
branches of international law, more specific research on the topic could be done with a more 
detailed focus on one branch - for example, on the topic of responsibility for cyberterrorism 
under international criminal law. As well, the definition of cyberterrorism but also legitimate 
weapons, targets, tools of cyberspace (under international humanitarian law) could be further 
researched. The topic of cyberterrorism and responsibility for the acts of cyberterrorism could 
also be opened up in a regional context. Legal loopholes and uncertainty could be overcome 
with academic research but also seeking the common understanding of the international 





Vastutus küberterrorismi eest rahvusvahelises õiguses 
RESÜMEE 
Nii terrorism kui ka küberrünnakud kujutavad endast olulist ohtu riiklikule ning 
rahvusvahelisele rahule, stabiilsusele ja julgeolekule. Info- ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogiate 
levik on lisaks võimalustele loonud ka väljakutseid rahvusvahelisele kogukonnale, riikidele, 
organisatsioonidele ja indiviididele, sealhulgas õigusloojatele ja õiguskaitseasutustele. Samuti 
valmistab siiani väljakutseid rahvusvahelise terrorismi uurimine, menetlemine, (universaalne) 
defineerimine ja toimepanijate vastutusele võtmine. Rahvusvahelisel kogukonnal lasub uus 
väljakutse tagada, et ka uue globaalse viienda domeeni vahendusel ja/või vastu suunatud 
rünnete toimepanijad, sh terroristid, kannaksid vastutust. Vastutuse tagamine ning 
karistamatuse vastu võitlemine eeldab selget, toimivat ja efektiivset õigusraamistikku 
reguleerimaks küberterrorismi.  
Sellest johtuvalt oli töö eesmärgiks läbi kehtiva rahvusvahelise õigusraamistiku analüüsimise 
leida vastus küsimusele, kas kehtiv rahvusvaheline õigus on piisav, et hoida potentsiaalsed 
küberterroristid vastutavana. Selleks on töös esmalt uuritud küberterrorismi olemust ja 
definitsiooni, teiseks on analüüsitud kehtivat rahvusvahelist õigusraamistikku küberterrorismi 
valguses, ja kolmandaks on töö viimases peatükis toodud ettepanekud meetoditest, mis 
tugevdaksid küberterroristide vastutusele võtmist ja vastava õigusliku raamistiku edendamist. 
Magistritöö esimene peatükk otsib vastuseid küsimusele, kuidas defineerida küberterrorismi. 
Terrorism, küberterrorism, küberrünnak ja kübersõda (ja teised seotud terminid) on kõik 
rahvusvaheliselt vaieldatavad mõisted. Küberterrorismile puudub ühene rahvusvaheliselt 
tunnustatud definitsioon. Küberterrorism koosneb kahest elemendist: küber ja terrorism. 
Riikidel on küberruumile ja terrorismile (ja sellest tulenevalt küberterrorismile) väga erinev 
käsitlus. Töös on käsitletud põgusalt terrorismi kui definitsiooni kujunemislugu, seda, kuidas 
sellest on saanud hukkamõistuna kasutatav termin, aga ka peavoolu arusaama terrorismist ja 
küberterrorismist, samuti terrorismi ja küberterrorismi kirjeldavaid omadusi. Esimese peatüki 
viimases osas on kirjeldatud rahvusvahelise kogukonna püüdlusi ametlikult defineerida 
küberterrorismi. Maailmas puudub ühene definitsioon terrorismist ja seega ka 
küberterrorismist. Küberruumi reguleerimise ja defineerimise puhul on väljakutseteks nii selle 
uudsus, kui ka riiklikult erinev lähenemine sellega hõlmatud valdkondadele, sealhulgas 
Interneti reguleerimine, valitsemine ja turvamine, inimõiguste ja vabaduste piiramine, jne. 
Terrorismi defineerimise ebaõnnestumiste põhjused võtab edukalt kokku levinud aforism, et 
“ühe mehe vabadusvõitleja on teise mehe terrorist”. Kuigi rahvusvaheline kogukond ei ole 
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olnud piisavalt üksmeelne, et terrorismi defineerida, on siiski tehtud olulisi edusamme selle 
mõiste sisustamisel. 
Töö teine peatükk keskendub küberterrorismi õiguslikule raamistikule, kus esmalt uuritakse  
terrorismi reguleerivat rahvusvahelist raamistikku. Kuna rahvusvaheline kogukond ei ole 
leidnud ühest definitsiooni terrorismile ja loonud üldist õiguslikku instrumenti (kuigi on seda 
üritanud), töötab praegune terrorismivastane võitlus põhiliselt riiklikul ja regionaalsel või 
sektoriaalsel (vastavalt konkreetsele terroriakti toimepanemisviisile ja vahendile) tasandil. 
Kuna efektiivne rahvusvahelise terrorismi vastane võitlus eeldab rahvusvahelist koostööd ja 
ühist raamistikku, jääb selline lähenemine poolikuks.  
Seejärel uuriti töös rahvusvahelist õigust küberterrorismi valguses. Ka küberterrorismile ei ole 
rahvusvahelist konventsiooni. Küberterrorismi on käsitletud suunavate, soovituslike ja 
hukkamõistvate väärtustega väljaannetes (ÜRO Peaassamblee otsused, ÜRO 
Julgeolekunõukogu otsused, aga ka mitmetasandiliste foorumite nagu UN GGE, OEWG ja 
Tallinn Manual avaldised). Nendes allikates on küberterrorismi ja küberterroristlike tegusi ka 
tõlgendatud, et pakkuda akadeemilist selgust ja soovitusi rahvusvahelise õiguse tõlgendamisel. 
Samuti on rahvusvahelised platvormid nagu näiteks OECD, ITU või Euroopa Komisjoni 
Arvutikuritegevusvastase konventsiooni näol pakkunud reegleid küberruumi reguleerimiseks. 
Küberkuritegusi (sealhulgas terrorismi) on adresseeritud ka regionaalsel tasandil, nagu näiteks 
Aasia ja Vaikse Ookeani Majanduskoostöö (ehk APEC), Kagu-Aasia Maade Assotsiatsiooni 
(lüh ASEAN) ja Hiina koostöö, Euroopa Liidu Nõukogu raames.  
Seejuures analüüsiti ius ad bellum ja sellega seotud põhimõtete (nagu suveräänsus, jõu 
kasutamise ja interventsiooni ehk mittesekkumise keeld, hoolsuskohustus) kohaldatavust 
küberterroristlikele tegudele. Üldiselt võib öelda, et need printsiibid kohalduvad ka 
küberterrorismile, kuid on selgusetu, kuidas ja mis ulatuses need kohalduvad. 
Järgmises alapeatükis käsitleti ius in bello ehk rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse kohaldatavust 
küberterroristlikele tegudele. Kuna rahvusvaheline humanitaarõigus on kirjutatud piisavalt 
üldiselt ja laiaulatuslikult, siis see kohaldub ka küberruumis toimuvale. Samas esineb teatud 
ebaselgusi, millised küberrelvad ja -sihtmärgid, ning rünnaku tagajärjed on rahvusvahelise 
humanitaarõiguse reeglite ja põhimõtete järgi lubatud. Samuti pole selge, kuidas need reeglid 
(Genfi konventsioonide teisest protokollist tulenevad reeglid) kohalduvad mitteriiklikele 
rühmitustele. 
Järgmisena analüüsitakse rahvusvahelise tavaõiguse kohaldatavust küberterrorismile. Kuigi 
osad allikad leiavad, et rahvusvaheline tavaõigus võiks kohalduda terrorismile, on pigem 
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kaheldav, kas terrorismi keeld on jõudnud rahvusvahelise tavaõiguse osaks saada. Seega on 
ebatõenäoline, et ka küberterrorism oleks rahvusvahelise tavaõiguse poolt reguleeritud. Samas 
rahvusvahelise õiguse printsiibid, mis on saanud tavaõiguse osaks (nagu näiteks jõu kasutamise 
keeld, hoolsuskohustus, riigivastutus) on rakendatavad ka küberterrorismi puhul. 
Järgmises alapeatükis on käsitletud riigivastusega seonduvaid küsimusi küberterrorismi 
kontekstis. Riigivastutust võiks kohaldada, kui riik kas ise paneb küberterroristliku rünnaku 
toime (nn riiklik terrorism), läbi agendi kontrollib ja juhib rünnakut või teadvustab ja võtab 
küberterroristliku kuriteo omaks. Samas võiks riik vastutada ka juhul, kui ei hoia ära 
küberterroristlikku rünnakut ja/või laseb sellel juhtuda. 
Seejärel analüüsitakse rahvusvahelise kriminaalõiguse kohaldatavust küberterrorismile ja 
üksikisiku vastutust. Terrorism ei ole eraldi kuritegu rahvusvahelise kriminaalõiguse 
raamistikus, kuid küberterroristlikud teod võiksid olla Rahvusvahelise Kriminaalkohtu Rooma 
statuudis reguleeritud sõjakuritegude, inimsusevastaste kuritegude ning genotsiidi 
regulatsioonidega hõlmatud, kui vastavate regulatsioonide kriteeriumid on samuti täidetud. 
Sellisel juhul võiks küberterroriste kui indiviide menetleda Rahvusvaheline Kriminaalkohus. 
Järgmisena käsitletakse rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste kohaldatavust küberterrorismi vastu 
võitlemisel, aga ka kohaldatavust küberterroristlikele tegudele. Inimõigused kohalduvad nii 
meetmetele, mida kasutatakse küberterrorismi vastu võitlemisel, kui ka riikidele kohustusena 
ennetada küberterrorismi. Kuigi küberterroristlikud rünnakud võivad tõsiselt rikkuda isikute 
inimõigusi ja vabadusi, on inimõiguste ja sellest tulenevate kohustuste kohaldamine 
mitteriiklikele organisatsioonidele problemaatiline, sest traditsiooniliselt on inimõiguste 
raamistikku kohaldatud inimese ja riigi vahelistele suhetele. Inimõiguste kohaldamine 
sõjaolukorras on samuti küsitav. Riike saab aga hoida vastutavana inimõiguste rikkumise eest, 
kui seoses küberterrorismiga ei ole näiteks loodud adekvaatset kriminaalsüsteemi või riik laseb 
küberterrorismil juhtuda. 
Töö kolmandas peatükis on toodud näiteid, kuidas rahvusvahelist raamistikku edendada, et 
küberterrorismi vastu võidelda ja küberterroriste vastutusele võtta. Selleks on pakutud praktilisi 
soovitusi, aga ka teoreetilisi väljavaateid. Soovituste hulgas pakuti välja näiteks rahvusvahelise 
õiguse edasine interpreteerimine küberterrorismi valguses, õiguse moderniseerimine, ühiste 
lähenemiste otsimine, õiguse harmoniseerimine, rahvusvaheline mitmetasandilise koostöö 
tugevdamine, aga ka uute regulatsioonide või uue konventsiooni vastuvõtmine, mis käsitleks 
küberterrorismi ja edendaks rahvusvahelist võitlust (küber)terrorismi ja süüdimatuse vastu. 
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Töös on kasutatud peamiselt rahvusvahelise õiguse allikaid, sh rahvusvahelised 
konventsioonid, kohtupraktika, üldpõhimõtted, aga ka (õigus)teadlaste artiklid. Töös on 
kasutatud kvalitatiivset dogmaatilist õigusanalüütilist meetodit, samuti deduktiivset analüütilist 
meetodit. Analüüsi käigus on terrorismi käsitlevaid definitsioone ja regulatsioone vaadeldud 
küberkontekstis. Analüüsi on ilmestatud näidetega terroristlikest rünnakutest, küberrünnakutest 
aga ka küberterroristlikest rünnakutest.  
Analüüsi käigus leiti vastuseid uurimisprobleemile, kas rahvusvaheline õigus on piisav 
tagamaks vastutust küberterrorismi eest. Töö analüütilises osas leiti, et kuigi rahvusvaheline 
õigus kohaldub küberterrorismile, siis see ei ole piisav tagamaks küberterroristlike tegude eest 
vastutusele võtmist. Töös pakuti välja teoreetilisi ja praktilisi võimalusi vastutuse 
tugevdamiseks. Muuhulgas oleks tarvis rohkem tõlgendada rahvusvahelise õiguse norme 
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